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The wise lawyer takes care to understand the scope of the protection
the law affords to statements made and acts done in connection with
settlement negotiations. This Article, which focuses on settlement nego-
tiations in federal courts, begins by exploring the scope of Federal Rule
of Evidence 408.1 I describe how far this rule's promise of confidentiality
extends and the circumstances under which it would permit communica-
tions made during settlement negotiations to be admitted into evidence at
trial.
Second, this Article discusses other possible sources of protection
against admissibility, especially Federal Rule of Evidence 4032 and stat-
* United States Magistrate, Northern District of California. B.A. 1966, Stanford Uni-
versity; M.A. 1967, Ph.D. 1975 Harvard University; J.D. 1975, University of California, Boalt
Hall School of Law.
Very useful discussions of the problem of confidentiality of settlement communications
can be found in Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsPuTE
RESOLUTION 1 (1986); Dauer, "Confidentiality in ADR," a chapter in a forthcoming book by
the Center for Public Resources entitled Containing Legal Costs: ADR Strategies for Corpo-
rations, Law Firms, and Government. I am especially indebted to the work by Professor
Green, which brought to my attention for the first time several important cases and concerns.
1. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 provides:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or
offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or at-
tempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount,
is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evi-
dence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not ad-
missible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another
purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of
undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
2. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
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utes that several states have recently enacted to encourage use of media-
tion. 3 This state legislation is significant because it erects a protective
shield around mediations that appears to be more difficult to penetrate
than the shields that Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and 403 erect around
settlement communications. Thus, counsel might want to take into ac-
count before filing a lawsuit or selecting the court in which to file it the
extent of the protection that is available for communications whose pur-
pose is to resolve the dispute before trial.4 When it is especially impor-
tant to preserve the confidentiality of such communications, lawyers
might consider mediation, as opposed to party-to-party settlement nego-
tiations or even a judicially hosted settlement conference, because of the
greater protection that some state laws seem to offer to mediation
proceedings.
Third, this Article examines the circumstances under which settle-
ment communications might be subject to pretrial discovery. It by no
means follows that material from settlement negotiations is protected
from discovery just because a rule of evidence would make that material
inadmissible for certain purposes at trial. In fact, the weight of authority
suggests that there is no generalized "privilege" for settlement communi-
cations and that they are discoverable, at least after a showing of substan-
tial need.5 Lawyers who conduct settlement negotiations on behalf of or
with public entities face an additional peril: there are a number of re-
ported cases in which the press or parties who were not involved in the
negotiations have been able to use the Freedom of Information Act,6 or a
state law equivalent to the Act, such as the California Public Records
Act,7 to force disclosure of settlement documents.8
Finally, this Article examines the effectiveness of alternative meth-
ods for enhancing protection of settlement communications, including
protective or sealing orders and side agreements. Although placing a set-
tlement under seal pursuant to a court order may be useful in some cir-
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.
3. See Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452 (1984);
infra note 385.
4. It is possible that federal courts sitting in diversity cases would construe the Erie
doctrine (see Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and its progeny) or Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 to require deference to state laws that confer privileged status on settle-
ment discussions or mediation proceedings.
5. See infra notes 156-217 and accompanying text.
6. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West Supp. 1988)
8. See infra notes 234-98 and accompanying text.
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cumstances, counsel cannot be confident that this procedure assures
protection of the settlement's confidentiality. In an important recent case
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, an entity
that was not a party to the settlement agreement successfully invoked its
common law right of access to court records to force disclosure of a set-
tlement agreement between purely private parties, even though that
agreement had been sealed by order of the District Court.9 Likewise,
counsel must appreciate the limitations of side agreements to protect the
confidentiality of a settlement. A recent opinion from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit distinguishes between "private"
judgments entered pursuant to settlement and "public" judgments so en-
tered,10 holding that in the latter the parties must disclose any side agree-
ments that would permit satisfaction of the judgment on lesser terms
than those reflected in the public record.11
The bottom line of this Article's analysis will be disheartening to
some: despite the policy that inspires rule 408, there are many circum-'
stances in which the things that lawyers and clients say and do during
settlement negotiations will not be protected from disclosure or barred
from use at trial. Thus, the prudent lawyer must think carefully about
what she communicates in the settlement context and about selecting the
safest possible environment for these communications. As I suggest in
subsequent sections, the state of the law in this area may offer an extra
incentive to parties who are especially interested in confidentiality to con-
duct their negotiations through a judicially hosted settlement conference
that is structured around private caucuses. 12 Counsel also should con-
sider using private contractual agreements to strengthen the protection of
the confidentiality of their settlement communications. 13
I. Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Failure to Fulfill its Promise
of Confidentiality
A. The Scope of Rule 408 Beyond the Common Law: Historical
Background and Policy Rationale
Federal courts had afforded an uneven and limited protection to set-
tlement proposals prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence
in 1975. The principal source of limitation on the scope of the common
9. Bank of Am. v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dened,
107 S, Ct. 921 (1987).
10. Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 584-85 (2d Cir. 1986),
11. .d,
12, See Infra text following note 394.
13, See Infra notes 395-408 and accompanying text.
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law doctrine applied prior to 1975 was the policy rationale that gave
birth to it: for most courts, the reason not to admit offers of compromise
lay in the notion that they were irrelevant. According to Wigmore, an
offer to settle evidenced only a party's desire to terminate the litigation; it
could not support any reliable inference about the merits of the claim or
the amount of damages.
14
While the "irrelevance rationale" could support exclusion of the
parties' offers or demands, the courts had considerable difficulty using
this rationale to exclude statements made by the parties or their conduct
while they were trying to negotiate a settlement. As a result, most courts
would not exclude from evidence admissions of fact that parties made
during settlement discussions unless the author explicitly made the state-
ment hypothetical, or incanted the prophylactic words "without preju-
dice," or unless the words constituting the admission were "so connected
with the offer as to be inseparable from it."
'
15
In drafting rule 408, the Advisory Committee decided that the com-
mon-law rationale for exclusion of offers of compromise was too narrow.
The Committee (and, eventually, the Supreme Court and Congress) con-
cluded that another rationale, recognized earlier by some courts, 16 was
"more consistently impressive."' 7 This rationale recognized that it was
in the public interest, and in the interest of individual litigants, to en-
courage consensual resolution of disputes. Thus, the Committee made
"compromise and settlement of disputes" the principal purpose of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 408.18 To promote that purpose, the Committee
reconstructed the law so as to expand considerably the zone of "freedom
of communication with respect to compromise."' 9 Most significantly,
the new rule offered protection not just to offers or demands, but also to
"conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations. ' 20 Thus, in
adopting this rule, the Supreme Court and Congress in effect reversed a
14. See 23 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5302
(1980); Note, supra note 3, at 447.
15. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note; see also Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Stu-
dents Int'l Meditation Soc'y, 501 F.2d 550, 553 (1st Cir. 1974) (court admitted notes with
calculations of amounts owed in breach of contract dispute); Megarry Bros. v. United States ex
rel. Midwestern Elec. Constr., Inc., 404 F.2d 479, 486 (8th Cir. 1968) (admission of testimony
of statement by opponent in settlement negotiations prejudicial error); Nau v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 261 F.2d 362, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1958) ("admission of fact will not be
summarily excluded simply because it was made in connection with an effort to compromise").
16. See, e.g., Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 286 F.2d 933, 938-39
(5th Cir. 1961).
17. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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long line of federal cases that refused to protect unqualified (e.g., not in
hypothetical form) statements of fact or admissions that were made dur-
ing the course of settlement talks.
21
The importance of the principal rationale for rule 408 cannot be
overemphasized. As articulated by the District Court in Minnesota
shortly after the rule was adopted, "Itihe purpose for the privilege sur-
rounding offers of compromise is to encourage free and frank discussion
with a view toward settling the dispute."'22 Counsel should use this ra-
tionale to enhance the protections the law affords their and their clients'
words and deeds in settlement negotiations. Counsel should preface let-
ters and direct or telephonic oral communications that are designed to
contribute to prospects for settlement with an express statement that
their purpose is to explore possible bases for settlement or to promote
settlement negotiations. Lawyers who find themselves trying to dissuade
a court from admitting evidence involving settlement negotiations should
argue vigorously that a ruling in favor of admission would pose a grave
threat to the policy objective that is at the heart of the rule. That policy
objective is vital to the survival of our court system, for if a large percent-
age of our cases did not settle, the backlog in our courts would become
totally intolerable.
The language of rule 408 unfortunately leaves a great deal of uncer-
tainty about the scope of the rule. Trial judges must make judgments on
a relatively unguided basis in many gray areas. It is in these areas that
resort to the primary purpose of the rule is most important.
Counsel can argue persuasively that this is a rule that the courts
could easily eviscerate. By resolving close cases in favor of admitting the
evidence, courts would strike fear into the hearts of negotiating lawyers
and clients and could compel them to play their settlement cards closer
to their chest. Negotiations would thus become more of an irrational
poker game and deprive parties of access to the reasoning that supports
one another's positions. To avoid this result, counsel should argue that
judges should construe the rule broadly. Broad construction of the rule
would enhance the rationality of the negotiation process and improve the
likelihood that litigants will understand the basis for the proposals that
are put on the table; litigants would thus feel good about the terms they
finally accept. Rationality promotes settlement and respect for the sys-
tem, and openness of communication is essential to rationality. Every
blow the courts strike against openness is a blow against the health of the
21. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
22. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn. 1976).
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system and against the fundamental values on which it is based. These
kinds of arguments should be effective because rationality is at the center
of the judiciary's self-image.
Because the drafters of rule 408 departed so substantially from the
principal thrust of the common-law tradition, lawyers cannot safely as-
sume that cases decided before 1975 offer reliable guidance about the
scope of the protection the rule affords. 23 An attorney will be on firmer
ground if he looks to ways in which state courts have interpreted provi-
sions from state law that served as models for the current federal rule.
California provided one such model when it adopted a rule extending
protection to statements made during compromise negotiations. 24 The
notes of the United States Senate's Committee on the Judiciary suggest
that provisions adopted in Nevada, New Mexico, and Wisconsin also
served as models for the federal rule.2
5
B. Two Key Prerequisites to Invoking the Rule
Two important prerequisites to successful invocation of rule 408
emerge clearly from its terms: the rule only offers protection if there is a
disputed claim, and it only applies to communications made or conduct
that occurs "in compromise negotiations." In other words, unless there
are both a real dispute and negotiations to resolve it, the rule provides no
help. Thus, if a client first acknowledges both the existence and size of a
debt, then the attorney tries to negotiate compromise terms of payment,
the conduct and statements receive no protection. 26 The Advisory Com-
mittee's notes articulate this limitation: "The policy considerations
which underlie the rule do not come into play when the effort is to induce
a creditor to settle an admittedly due amount for a lesser sum.... Hence,
the rule requires that the claim be disputed as to either validity or
amount." 27
Of course, rule 408 could afford protection if a client acknowledged
the existence of an obligation but did not concede its size. 28 It also is
important to emphasize that the rule's reference to claims for an
"amount" does not imply that its protections are available only in cases
in which a party seeks monetary relief. The rule clearly applies regard-
less of the character of the relief sought (legal or equitable) or the kinds
23. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 175-76.
24. Id. at 165-66, 172; see CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154 (West Supp. 1988).
25. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in FEDERAL CIVIL JUDICIAL PRO-
CEDURE AND RULES 283-84 (West 1987).
26. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 213-14.
27. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (citation omitted).
28. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 215, 249-50.
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of terms negotiated. As discussed below, however, a proposal to settle
that consisted of inviting the opposition to join in an illegal act or con-
spiracy would not be protected.
29
Counsel must beware of the possibility of narrow judicial views of
when a claim is "disputed" for purposes of the rule. For example, in
Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students International Meditation Society,
30
which was decided before rule 408 became effective but which acknowl-
edged that one purpose of the common-law rule was to encourage settle-
ment negotiations, the First Circuit upheld a decision to admit evidence
of an offer that was intended to conclude a frayed relationship and pre-
clude a follow-up lawsuit. The plaintiff had become "increasingly dissat-
isfied with the size of the periodic payments" that the defendant had been
making, payments whose size was supposed to be a function of the
number of the defendant's guests who used the plaintiff's facility. At
trial, the plaintiff testified that, on the day the last payment was due, the
defendant handed the plaintiff a sheet of paper that contained calcula-
tions and a bottom line figure and said "This is what we owe you. If you
agree and sign a release absolving us from any and all damage and all
future bills we will pay you."
' 31
Both the trial court and the appellate court held that this statement
was not entitled to protection as an offer of compromise. Recognizing
that the "rule excluding offers of settlement is designed to encourage set-
tlement negotiations after a controversy has actually arisen,"32 the appel-
late court reasoned that the defendant's statement did not qualify for
protection because the plaintiff could not be sure there was "an actual
controversy" until the defendant tendered its final payment. 33 The ap-
pellate court found that the making of the subject statement marked the
beginning of the "actual controversy" for purposes of rule 408. 34 Read-
ers should appreciate what this reasoning means: courts may deny pro-
tection even though (1) before the subject statement was made both sides
knew that plaintiff was dissatisfied with defendant's performance and
that litigation was a clear possibility, and (2) the obvious purpose of the
statement was to make an offer, which, if accepted, would settle accounts
and preclude any subsequent lawsuit.
Counsel also must beware of courts making a distinction between
29. Id
30. 501 F.2d 550, 553 (Ist Cir. 1974).
31. Id
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mere business communications, which are not entitled to protection, and
"offers of compromise," which are.35 The key to drawing this line lies in
how the courts define "dispute" or "controversy" for purposes of rule
408. If the dynamic between the parties does not qualify as a "dispute"
within the meaning of the rule, then by definition communications can-
not constitute offers of compromise.
Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 36 first sug-
gested the distinction between business communications and offers of
compromise. Prior to the filing of the action, plaintiff and defendant had
exchanged correspondence to determine which company had the right to
use the phrase "Big Foot" to identify its tires. In this correspondence,
the plaintiff claimed that it had exclusive trademark rights in this phrase.
In response the defendant indicated, among other things, that if the
plaintiff sued "the case would be in litigation long enough that Goodyear
might obtain all the benefits it desired from the term 'Bigfoot.' ,,37 Thus,
at the time the subject communications took place, clearly (1) the parties
had a real and economically significant disagreement about who had the
right to use the phrase "Big Foot," (2) the purpose of the subject com-
munications was to attempt to resolve this disagreement, and (3) litiga-
tion was a real possibility.
Despite these facts, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's con-
clusion that the communications from the defendant in this context did
not qualify for protection under rule 408 and should be admitted into
evidence. 38 Although the judges may have been motivated by a desire to
punish the defendant for its "strong-arm" negotiating tactics, 39 the "law"
that emerges from this appellate court opinion remains with us and can
be troublesome for lawyers who make good faith efforts to negotiate set-
tlements before lawsuits are filed. The Tenth Circuit seemed to suggest
that the correspondence remained mere "business communications" be-
cause at the time the letters were sent the "discussions had not crystal-
lized to the point of threatened litigation, a clear cutoff point."4 The
court apparently felt that it was not until the parties had exchanged posi-
tions through their letters that they could know that the plaintiff's claim
was in fact "disputed" within the meaning of rule 408.
The difficulty with this reasoning lies in the implication that rule
35. See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
36. 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 1368.
38. Id. at 1373.
39. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 214.
40. Big 0 Tire Dealers, 561 F.2d at 1373.
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408's protections are available only after negotiations have degenerated
to the point at which one party threatens litigation. In a slightly more
recent Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Hooper, the court obliquely
suggests (but does not unequivocally announce) the even more troubling
idea that the protections of rule 408 might be available only when a law-
suit is already on file.41 If adopted by other courts, the overly technical
and demanding views suggested by the Big 0 and Hooper courts would
defeat one of the principal purposes of the rule: to encourage parties to
settle their disagreements outside the court system.
Some courts have adopted more generous interpretations that are
less threatening to rule 408's purposes. For example, in Olin Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America,42 the District Court concluded that
there was a disputed claim within the meaning of rule 408 because the
plaintiff reasonably "contemplated that litigation might be necessary,"
and another party "conceded that litigation was possible." The court
reached this conclusion even though no suit had been filed and the par-
ties might not have known they were fully at loggerheads.43
There is another context in which courts may find rule 408 inappli-
cable because no "dispute" existed prior to the time the subject commu-
nication occurred. Cassino v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,44 concerned the
admissibility of a document entitled "Settlement Agreement and General
Release" that defendant had asked plaintiff to sign during a meeting in
which defendant informed plaintiff that he was being terminated. "The
document, which Cassino refused to sign, offered $18,000 in exchange for
Cassino's release of all claims against [defendant] 'including, but not lim-
ited to, rights under federal, state or local laws prohibiting age or other
forms of discrimination .... ,-45 It is important to note that the Cassino
result may reflect, sub silentio, the court's belief that the interests pro-
tected by federal statutes that prohibit age discrimination simply out-
weigh the interests that might have been advanced by permitting the
defendant in this case to use rule 408 to bar admission of a document the
court believed was probative of defendant's motive in terminating an
older employee.
In concluding that this document was admissible, however, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished between an offer that is
41. See United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219, 225 (7th Cir. 1979).
42. 603 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
43. See Gangl v. Gangl, 281 N.W.2d 574 (N.D. 1979) (construing the parallel state court
rule, N.D.R. Ev. 408).
44. 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987).
45. Id at 1342.
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extended to try to settle a dispute that arises "after the termination," and
an offer that is presented at the time the decision to terminate is commu-
nicated to the employee. 46 Characterizing offers made at the time of ter-
mination as proposed "termination agreements," the court observed that
such proposals "are generally made a part of the record in the case and
are considered relevant to the circumstances surrounding the alleged dis-
criminatory discharge itself. The termination agreements, therefore, are
probative on the issue of discrimination. '47 The "record" alluded to by
the court presumably is the record developed during administrative pro-
ceedings on the underlying claim. Administrative bodies' routine consid-
eration of these kinds of documents supports the court's conclusion that
the documents are probative on the core liability issue; but that fact has
no bearing on the scope of a rule of evidence that is inapplicable in the
administrative context.
To support its holding that rule 408 barred admission of the pro-
posed settlement and release agreement, the Cassino court relied on only
one proposition: "the protections of Rule 4.08 were designed to en-
courage the compromise and settlement of existing disputes. ' 48 The
Court emphasized not the language or policies of the rule, but the proba-
tive weight (on the liability issue) of the content and timing of the settle-
ment offer:
Where, as here, the employer tries to condition severance pay upon the
release of potential claims, the policy behind Rule 408 does not come
into play. Rule 408 should not be used to bar relevant evidence con-
cerning the circumstances of the termination itself simply because one
party calls its communication with the other party a "settlement
offer."
49
Perhaps significantly, the court promptly added that "[s]uch com-
munications may also tend to be coercive rather than conciliatory."' 50
The court proceeded to admonish that " 'courts should not allow em-
ployers to compromise the underlying policies of the ADEA 51 [Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act] by taking advantage of a superior
bargaining position or by overreaching.' "52 This language suggests that
Cassino may be another case in which the judiciary's hostility to "strong-
arm" bargaining helps to explain the court's analysis of rule 408. In the
end, however, one senses that the principal reason that the Cassino court
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1343 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982).
52. 817 F.2d at 1343 (citations omitted).
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insisted on construing rule 408 narrowly was the court's understandable
belief that the policies that inspire rule 408 simply are not as important
as those that inspire the ADEA.
What lessons should counsel learn from these cases? First, the poli-
cies that inform rule 408 often will be in competition with other social
policies, and that competition may cause some courts to interpret the
rule narrowly. A second lesson, implicit in Big 0 and Cassino, is that
many courts do not like "strong-arm" negotiation strategies.5 3 Judges
are especially likely to resent litigants or lawyers who try to use the cost
and delay of litigation to gain an advantage to which they know they are
not entitled. The most significant lesson from Big 0 is that some courts
might punish your client if they believe that its bargaining position is not
based on its perception of the merits of the case, but reflects a self-con-
scious attempt to use the fact that it will cost your opponent a great deal
of money or take him a great deal of time to get relief through the court
system or both.
The technical lesson from Big 0, Hiram Ricker & Sons, 54 and Cas-
sino is this: To maximize the odds that communications will be pro-
tected by rule 408, an attorney should either (1) file suit before beginning
negotiations (a move may not be conducive to constructive discussions)
or (2) announce, as a preface to communications, that he is invoking the
protections of rule 408, that communications already completed between
the parties establish that they have a dispute, that his client fears the
dispute could lead to litigation, and that the purpose of his communica-
tion is to present an offer of compromise and to contribute to negotia-
tions looking toward a settlement agreement. The problem with this
advice is that by following either route an attorney risks damaging the
prospects for creating the kind of feelings between the parties that are
most conducive to reaching agreement. It is unfortunate that tough
cases (and overreaching litigants) have forced courts to construe rule 408
in ways that tend to defeat its purposes.
I There is authority, however, for the view that statements need not
rise to the level of formal "offers" in order to qualify for protection.
Communications whose primary purpose is to explore whether an oppo-
nent is interested in discussing settlement should be protected, as should
communications that solicit an offer or a demand from an opponent.55
Moreover, as long as it is viewed either as part of an effort to negotiate
settlement or as an offer of compromise, a proposal to refer a dispute to
53. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 214.
54. See cases cited infra notes 155-217.
55. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 178.
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arbitration or to some other alternative dispute resolution procedure also
should come within the ambit of the rule.
56
II. The Principal Limitations on the Scope of Rule 408
Unfortunately for lawyers and clients who want "free and frank dis-
cussion" 57 to maximize the odds of achieving settlement, limits on the
scope of rule 408 result in many circumstances in which courts may ad-
mit into evidence even communications that clearly were part of good
faith negotiations, the sole purpose of which was to settle claims that
already have been filed in court.
The primary reason counsel cannot safely assume that their commu-
nication will be protected by rule 408, however, is not the possibility that
courts might construe narrowly the threshold requirements that there be
a "claim" and that it be "disputed." The more consequential limit on the
rule's scope is the proviso that it applies only when the purpose of admit-
ting evidence from the negotiations is "to prove liability for or invalidity
of the claim or its amount."158 Thus, by its own terms, rule 408 does not
preclude admission of offers of compromise, or statements made in nego-
tiations, when admitting the evidence would serve any purpose other
than directly proving or disproving liability for or the amount of the
claim. Because there are so many other purposes for which such evi-
dence might be admitted, because it is impossible to forecast the likeli-
hood that any such purpose will surface at trial, and because the outcome
of any given judge's balancing analysis under rule 403 is not predictable,
the wise lawyer has no choice but to be circumspect when negotiating
directly with the opposition.
This sobering position means that counsel either must accept only
half-rational negotiations (the "blind man's bluff" approach, in which
neither side has meaningful access to the reasoning that supports the
other side's view of the case) or must look to some device other than rule
408 to protect the confidentiality of what they say during negotiations. I
describe some of the alternative sources of protection after briefly dis-
cussing some of the purposes for which evidence from settlements might
be offered other than to "prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or
its amount. '5
9
There are many purposes for which settlement negotiation evidence
might be offered that would not be within the scope of rule 408. The
56. Id. at 202-03.
57. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn. 1976).
58. FED. R. EvID. 408.
59. Id.
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most significant of these are (1) to impeach a witness; (2) to negative a
contention of undue delay; (3) to prove wrongful acts during negotia-
tions; (4) to prove the existence of or to block enforcement of an alleged
settlement contract; and (5) to show the state of mind of a party. The
principal impression created by most of the cases discussed in this section
is that the scope of rule 408 is indeed limited and that many courts ap-
pear to be quite comfortable permitting parties to brush past the thin veil
of confidentiality that surrounds settlement negotiations. Before turning
to these cases, however, I point out that there is authority for the view
that the policies that inspire rule 408 are so important that courts should
interpret the scope of its protection liberally and should resolve doubts
about its scope by refusing to admit evidence from settlement
negotiations.
One recent case exemplifies this liberal spirit. In Stacey v. Bangor
Punta Corp., 60 Judge Carter refused to rule in advance of trial that evi-
dence of a settlement between the plaintiff and a third-party defendant
should be admitted, even though the defendant's proffer showed that the
purpose of the evidence would be to establish the bias of the third party
defendant and not to prove the "invalidity of the claim or its amount."
In announcing that he would not rule on this motion until the unfolding
of the trial itself better exposed "exactly the context in which Defendants
will seek to offer [the] evidence," Judge Carter quoted with approval the
following passage from a treatise by Professors Louisell and Mueller:
There are, to be sure, purposes for which the proof [of settlement] is
competent, but these are relatively narrow. It is well recognized, and
rightly so, that the risks of prejudice and confusion entailed in receiv-
ing settlement evidence are such that often Rule 403 and the underly-
ing policy of Rule 408 [to encourage settlement] require exclusion even
when a permissible purpose can be discerned.
61
Judge Carter went on to point out that it is often difficult to keep
separate the purposes for which evidence is offered, and that if issues of
impeachment "are inextricably bound up with issues of causation and
liability," as they sometimes are, offers of evidence made ostensibly to
impeach might still run "afoul of Rule 408. ' '62
These passages from Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp. suggest a point
that we must keep clearly in mind while journeying through the forest of
cases that conclude that rule 408 offers no protection because the purpose
for which the settlement material is proferred is not to "prove liability for
60. 620 F. Supp. 636, 637 (D. Me. 1985).
61. Id. (citing 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 170, at 272
(1978)).
62. Id. (citing McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 250-51 (1st Cir. 1985)).
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or invalidity of the claim or its amount." Courts cannot assume that
evidence from settlement negotiations is admissible simply because it is
offered for a real purpose other than one of the purposes prohibited by
rule 408.63 In this situation courts also must conduct a balancing analy-
sis under rule 403. Before deciding to admit settlement evidence, judges
must be satisfied that its probative value is not clearly outweighed by any
prejudice, confusion, or delay that introducing it might cause.
Counsel also should understand that trial judges have discretion in
fixing the scope and content of cross-examination and that rule 408 does
not destroy that discretion even when evidence of settlement is offered
for some purpose other than that to prove liability. The Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Reichenbach v. Smith 64 illustrates this point well. Without
adverting to rule 403 at all, the Reichenbach court upheld the district
judge's decision to exclude evidence of plaintiff's settlement with a co-
defendant even though the proffered purpose was to challenge the credi-
bility of plaintiff's testimony. In upholding the trial judge's ruling the
appellate court emphasized the importance of encouraging settlements
and the role confidentiality can play in the settlement dynamic. The
Fifth Circuit panel proceeded to declare that when ruling on an objection
to the admission of evidence of settlement rule 408 permits the trial judge
to:
balance the policy of encouraging settlements with the need for evalu-
ating the credibility of the witnesses.... The importance of informing
the jurors fully so that they can carefully judge the credibility of each
witness in making their fact determination may in some situations out-
weigh the desire to encourage settlements. But this choice must be
made in the first instance by the trial judge.
65
The appellate court went on to affirm the trial judge's conclusion that
because there were other, obvious reasons for scrutinizing closely the
plaintiff's testimony, admitting the evidence of the settlement would not
add significantly to the jury's ability to assess her credibility. Because it
was reasonable to conclude that admitting the evidence of the settlement
would not contribute materially to the jury's ability to assess credibility,
the trial judge committed no harmful error by deciding that the balance
tipped in favor of encouraging settlement.
66
Inexplicably, however, the Reichenbach panel added a concluding
paragraph that seems inconsistent with the body of its opinion and that
appears to take away much of the discretion the court had just acknowl-
63. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
64. 528 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1976).




edged. The court emphasized that its "affirmance is not to be considered
an approval for the future of the trial court's approach. The existence of
a settlement agreement goes directly to the issue of credibility and usu-
ally the better approach is that codified in rule 408."67 While this last
paragraph obviously compromises the utility of this opinion for lawyers
resisting the admission of settlements, the reasoning in the body of the
opinion is sound and consistent with the body of doctrine developed sep-
arately under rule 403.
A. Impeachment
The first purpose outside rule 408's scope for which settlement ma-
terial might be offered is impeachment. The word "impeachment" is
used to embrace a great many purposes for which evidence might be in-
troduced at trial. These purposes include showing witness bias or preju-
dice; demonstrating that a prior claim of the opponent is inconsistent
with his present claim or that the present claim was omitted from a prior
action in which it logically should have appeared; or providing evidence
that a party made a prior statement that is inconsistent with a statement
made at trial. When thinking about the scope of rule 408, lawyers must
appreciate that whether it will serve as an obstacle to admissibility may
depend in part on which kind of impeachment is being attempted.
(1) Bias or Prejudice of a Witness
Despite the fact that the ultimate purpose for introducing impeach-
ing evidence is to help the proffering party win the case on the merits (or
at least to affect the size of the damage award), and thus, in the language
of the rule, "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its
amount," many courts would hold that rule 408 does not bar admission
of statements made during negotiations if the immediate purpose is to
impeach by proving "bias or prejudice of a witness." 68 By its express
terms, the rule "does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered
for... proving bias or prejudice of a witness."
'69
A classic example of the application of this express limitation on the
scope of the rule arises when one of several defendants settles with the
plaintiff, then appears at trial to testify on the plaintiff's behalf. In this
setting, some courts interpret rule 408 as permitting the non-settling de-
67. Id. at 1076.
68. But cf Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 620 F.Supp. 636, 637 (D. Me. 1985) (prema-
ture to determine admissibility of evidence of plaintiff's settlement with third party defendant
prior to offer of evidence of settlement).
69. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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fendants to introduce the terms of the settlement agreement in an effort
to show that the testifying former defendant is biased in favor of the
plaintiff.
The opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in John
McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 70 illustrates this point. In this case,
the plaintiff had settled a purported $25,000 property damage claim with
one of the named defendants for consideration that had two elements:
(1) the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff ten dollars and (2) the de-
fendant permitted the plaintiff to use one of the defendant's employees as
an expert witness at trial. When the employee testified at trial, the dis-
trict judge permitted the remaining defendant to introduce evidence
about the terms of the earlier settlement agreement, on the theory that
these terms could support an inference that the employee-expert witness
was biased in favor of the plaintiff.71 On appeal, the court concluded that
this ruling neither offended rule 408 nor constituted an abuse of the trial
court's discretion under rule 403.72
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit panel characterized
quite narrowly the "core of the public policy that the rule against admis-
sion of compromises was designed to vindicate. ' 73 That policy, accord-
ing to the court, "encourages negotiation by preventing the parties to the
compromise from being tied elsewhere to the concession they made inter
sese." 74 Unfortunately, this narrow view ignores the Advisory Commit-
tee's and Congress' use of rule 408 to expand the common-law protection
so that not just offers and demands would be covered, but also (as the
language of the rule itself states) "conduct or statements made in com-
promise negotiations." Moreover, since the purpose of the extended cov-
erage was to encourage "freedom of communication with respect to
compromise, ' 75 it is clear that the drafters of the rule intended to do
much more than reduce fear of the one danger that the McShain opinion
acknowledged, namely the fear of "being tied elsewhere to the concession
... made inter sese. " 7 6
70. 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 635.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 635 n.5.
74. Id.
75. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
76. John McShain, Inc. 563 F.2d at 635 n.5; see Quad Graphics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d
1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1983). For further discussion of McShain, see C. WRIGHT & K. GRA-
HAM, supra note 14, at 201, 262-67. See also Sharp v. Hall, 482 F. Supp 1 (D. Okla. 1978)
(whether jury should be fully advised of fact of settlement and amount thereof is a matter
resting in the sound discretion of the trial court); L. J. Vontz Constr. Co. v. Alliance Indus.,
Inc., 215 Neb. 268, 272-73, 338 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1983) (evidence relating to a "Mary Carter"
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Professors Wright and Graham have pointed out another problem
that the McShain court ignored: when judges permit introduction of evi-
dence that the plaintiff settled a closely related claim against a former co-
defendant on terms that are generous to the former defendant, the jury
might infer that the plaintiff really does not believe in his claim against
the remaining defendant.77 It is precisely this risk that rule 408 was
designed to avoid. The principal fear that inspires exclusion of evidence
of offers of compromise is that juries will interpret these offers as
acknowledgements that a claim or defense is weak or meritless. Given
this risk, lawyers should argue that even if a literal reading of rule 408
would not block admission of evidence about offers or demands, the bal-
ancing analysis (weighing probative value against the likelihood of unfair
prejudice) required under rule 403 would compel exclusion.
Counsel looking for support for this line of argument can cite Ken-
non v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 78 a recent opinion from the Fifth Circuit. In
this case a divided appellate court held that a trial judge violated rule 408
and committed reversible error when, in explaining to the jury the sud-
den absence of three defendants, he disclosed not just the fact that plain-
tiff had settled with them, but also that the amount of the settlement was
a nominal ten dollars each. 79 The Kennon majority acknowledged that
the purpose of disclosing the fact of the settlement was to avoid jury
confusion, but insisted that in the circumstances presented there was "no
proper purpose" for disclosing the amount.80 Thus by disclosing the
amount of the settlement the trial court had violated rule 408.
Having reached that conclusion, the appellate court was required to
proceed to the next question: Did the violation of the rule require rever-
sal? To answer this question, the Fifth Circuit panel had to assess the
likelihood and probable magnitude of unfair prejudice to the remaining
defendant. The centerpiece of the court's justification for reversing and
remanding was its conclusion that when the trial judge disclosed the
terms of the settlement, he created a great risk of extreme prejudice to
the remaining defendant."' The court's words have significant implica-
tions for many issues concerning the scope of rule 408:
First, the fact that the settlement was for a nominal amount suggests
that the plaintiffs thought that the settling defendants were not liable
agreement--covenant not to execute-should be admitted where the agreement bears upon the
bias and credibility of witnesses employed by a party to an agreement).
77. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 264.
78. 794 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986).
79. Id. at 1071.
80. Id. at 1070.
81. Id.
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for the plaintiff's injuries and therefore points the finger at Slip-
streamer as the one responsible. Just as we held in McHann v. Fire-
stone Tire and Rubber Co., that informing the jury of a large settlement
by a co-defendant might lead the jury to believe that only the co-de-
fendant, and not the nonsettling defendant, was negligent, the disclo-
sure of the "nominal" ten dollar settlement in this case suggests to the
jury that Slipstreamer alone was liable. Furthermore, the willingness
of the plaintiff to settle for a pittance with the other defendants could
be taken by the jury as a reflection of the strength of the plaintiffs' case
against Slipstreamer.
8 2
Based on these and other considerations, the majority held that "no
party, or the court, should disclose to the jury the amount of a settlement
with other defendants in the absence of compelling circumstances de-
manding disclosure .... *83 The fact that the court's logic about the
scope of rule 408 is not air-tight 84 should not obscure this opinion's im-
portance: it delineates the kind of substantial prejudice that can result
from admitting terms of settlement into evidence and makes it clear that
courts have a responsibility to weigh this prejudice when deciding
whether to admit such evidence, regardless of the technical purpose for
which it is proffered. In the end, the Kennon opinion may prove more
useful to courts conducting analyses under rule 403 than under rule 408.
In either event, it casts a long shadow of doubt over the continuing vital-
ity of opinions like John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.
85
(2) Prior Inconsistent or Omitted "Claims"
Another form of impeachment that might not be prevented by rule
408 involves evidence that before trial the opposing party made a claim
that is inconsistent with a claim he is pressing at trial. As Professors
Wright and Graham point out, rule 408, by it own terms, applies to offers
of compromise and to statements made "in compromise negotiations,"
but not to claims.86 Thus there is some risk that a court would view a
party's initial demand not as an offer of compromise of a disputed claim
but as a description by that party of what his claim embraces. For exam-
ple, in Reich v. Reich, 87 the court decided that the evidence of how much
a party was willing to pay for her interest in property was not an offer of
compromise but a reflection of what she believed to be the value of the
property. Courts also might permit an opponent to introduce evidence of
82. Id. at 1070 (citation and footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 1071.
84. Id. at 1075-76 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
85. 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977).
86. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5311 at 266.
87. 235 Kan. 339, 344, 680 P.2d 545, 549 (1984).
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an initial demand to show that it did not include some claim that the
plaintiff later pressed at trial. In Fieldson Associates v. WhitecliffLabora-
tories, Inc., 88 a California appellate court construed a state law counter-
part to rule 408 to permit a defendant to prove the scope of a contract by
introducing evidence that the plaintiff had not made a claim for lost
profits.8 9
The view that rule 408 simply does not apply to statements of claims
can be interpreted as a variation on the theme described above, which
provides that the parties may seek the protection of this provision only
after they know that there is a "dispute." If taken too literally, this re-
quirement would mean that rule 408 could apply only after an initial
offer or demand has been rejected. This obviously makes no sense, in
part because such an interpretation would not encourage settlements and
would frustrate the purposes of the rule, and in part because it is not
consistent with the "real world." Opening offers or demands are often in
fact "compromise" proposals, made in an environment in which every-
one knows the parties do not see eye-to-eye about how a particular mat-
ter should be resolved.
The situation is different, of course, when a debtor expressly admits
that he owes a specified sum, but offers to pay a smaller figure in the hope
that the creditor will accept it rather than go through the hassle and
expense of litigation to collect. The Advisory Committee's notes to rule
408 make it clear that the "policy considerations which underlie the rule
do not come into play when the effort is to induce a creditor to settle an
admittedly due amount for a lesser sum." 90 Good lawyers will argue,
however, that except when a party expressly concedes the amount of its
obligation, courts should not construe rule 408 either to discourage par-
ties from being the first to put an offer or demand on the table or to force
the careful lawyer to inflate his client's opening demand to cover every
conceivable claim, thus eliminating the possibility of a later argument
that because something was omitted his client does not really believe in
the validity of it.91
The moral of these stories is relatively straightforward. The careful
lawyer should preface an opening demand or offer by expressly stating
that there is a dispute between the parties and that the proposal being
advanced reflects neither a complete statement of the client's claims nor a
full valuation of them. Rather, the lawyer should make clear that the
88. 276 Cal. App. 2d 770, 773, 81 Cal. Rptr. 332, 334 (1969).
89. Id. at 772-73, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 333-34 (interpreting CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1152, 1154).
90. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
91. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 197-98.
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proposal is an offer of compromise made in the hope that it will produce
a settlement and thus enable both sides to avoid the cost and delay asso-
ciated with litigating to judgment.
(3) Prior Inconsistent Statements
One of the most common forms of impeachment consists of evi-
dence that a party or witness on some earlier occasion made a statement
that is arguably inconsistent with a statement he or she has made on the
stand during trial. Rule 408 bars admission of offers or demands, or
statements made in settlement negotiations, if the direct and immediate
purpose is "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount."
Thus a party clearly cannot introduce evidence of pretrial offers or state-
ments made during negotiations as part of that party's case-in-chief on
the liability or damages issues before the party who allegedly made the
statement testifies. Surprisingly, however, courts have not formulated a
consistent, reliable body of doctrine to determine the extent to which rule
408 bars evidence of pretrial offers or statements made during negotia-
tions (1) when the party who allegedly made them has given testimony at
trial with which the pretrial offer or statement is arguably inconsistent
and (2) when the purpose of introducing the evidence is to attack that
party's credibility by calling into question his veracity, memory, or accu-
racy of perception.
There is support from commentators and in cases for both sides of
this issue. Among commentators, Professors Redden and Saltzburg take
the position that it would effectively defeat the principal purposes of rule
408 to hold that it permits admission of statements made in negotiations
solely because they are arguably inconsistent with testimony offered by a
party at trial. 92 Professors Louisell and Mueller seem to line up on the
other side.93 Professors Wright and Graham also advocate admission of
such statements, even though they do so without overwhelming convic-
tion, and after acknowledging that the competing arguments are not
without substance.94 The few judicial opinions in this area are not elabo-
rately reasoned, but most seem to favor admission of settlement commu-
nications for impeachment purposes when the communications qualify as
92. K. REDDEN & S. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 172 (2d ed.
1977). Additional support for this view from commentators can be found in M. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 255-56 (1981); Waltz & Huston, The Rules of Evidence
in Settlement, 5 LITIGATION 11, 16 (1981); Kirkpatrick, Reforming Evidence Law in Oregon,
59 OR. L. REV. 43, 67 (1980).
93. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 277 (1978).
94. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 227-28; see Blakely, Article IV- Rele-
vancy and Its Limits, 20 Hous. L. REv. 151, 242 (1983).
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prior inconsistent statements. 95 Judicial support for the opposite view
can be found in C & K Engineering Contractors v. American Steel Co.,
Inc.9
6
The next few paragraphs suggest arguments that could be used by
lawyers whose objective is to persuade a court that rule 408 does not
permit admission of statements made by a party opponent during negoti-
ations merely because the statements are arguably inconsistent with testi-
mony by that party at trial. Counsel should keep in mind, however, that
even if they fail to persuade the court that rule 408 should be so con-
strued, they may still be able to mount powerful arguments against ad-
mission under rule 403, since the evidence's marginal contribution to the
jury's capacity to assess the credibility of the witness often clearly will be
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, and digression into
collateral matters.
97
The most important argument counsel can make under rule 408 is
that to admit statements made during negotiations simply because they
are arguably inconsistent with a party's prior trial testimony would evis-
cerate the rule completely. To admit such statements would make a
mockery of the rule's promise of confidentiality and defeat the rationale
that inspires it. This follows because it is extremely difficult to articulate
positions at different times that are completely consistent and because it
is so easy to find some tension between virtually any two statements on
the same subject. Even Professors Wright and Graham concede that in-
terpreting rule 408 to permit the admission of statements merely because
they are inconsistent with trial testimony threatens to reduce "the second
sentence of Rule 408 to a cipher.
'" 98
If lawyers and parties know there is a great risk that what they say
in settlement negotiations may be used against them at trial, they will
retreat into a shell of secrecy and non-communication in the pretrial pe-
riod, thus turning settlement "negotiations" into little more than postur-
ing and poker-playing. If parties are afraid to share the reasoning that
supports and explains their offers and demands, they bear a greater risk
that the substantive terms of settlement agreements will not reflect ra-
tional and fair resolutions of disputes. Since so many of our cases are
95. See, eg., County of Hennepinrv. AFG Indus., Inc., 726 F.2d 149, 153 (8th Cir. 1984);
American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Teasdale, 733 F.2d 559, 568 (8th Cir. 1984); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Arkansas Sheriff's Boys Ranch, 280 Ark. 53, 63-65, 655 S.W.2d 389, 394-95
(1983); In re Commodore Hotel Fire and Explosion, 324 N.W.2d 245, 248 (Minn. 1982).
96. 23 Cal. 3d 1, 12-13, 587 P.2d 1136, 1142-43, 151 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329-30 (1978) (inter-
preting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155).
97. See infra notes 125-54 and accompanying text.
98. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 227.
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concluded by settlement agreements, it is unseemly to interpret rules of
evidence in a way that significantly reduces the likelihood that settle-
ments will be rational and that the parties will feel the settlements are
fair. The courts' interpretation of evidentiary rules should promote ra-
tionality and respect for the ways disputes are resolved in the system
rather than irrationality and cynicism.
Counsel can buttress these policy arguments by noting that the only
form of impeachment acknowledged by the rule itself is proof of "bias or
prejudice of a witness." In addition, all of the cases cited in the Advisory
Committee's note supporting admissibility for purposes of impeachment
involved evidence of generous settlements with former defendants who
were subsequently called to testify at trial on behalf of plaintiff.99 It
seems unlikely that the drafters of the rule would have failed to mention
as common a form of impeachment as prior inconsistent statements, if
they felt that it should constitute an exception to rule 408. Moreover, it
is difficult to imagine that the drafters did not see that the apparent
promise of meaningful protection offered by rule 408 would be a charade
and a huge trap for the unwary if impeachment by a prior inconsistent
statement were considered a sufficient basis for admission.
Counsel also can argue that there are other well-established "excep-
tions" to rule 408 that give courts ample power to admit evidence neces-
sary to correct wrongs committed during settlement negotiations. As
discussed below, there is clear authority to admit evidence of statements
made during negotiations if the purpose is to show illegality in the terms
of an agreement or that an agreement was acquired through fraudulent
representations or omissions. 100 Similarly, courts have held that because
rule 408 applies only to genuine compromises of real disputes, it offers no
protection when statements made during negotiations or the terms of an
agreement tend to show that a purported settlement was in fact a sham.
For example, rule 408 would not protect a statement that a settlement
was entered solely to buy the testimony of a former defendant, or to in-
duce him to pretend to remain active in the case by pursuing claims
against co-defendants in order to give plaintiff more leverage with those
other defendants.' 0
The only wrong that a party could hide behind rule 408 if courts
refuse to admit statements made during negotiations simply because they
99. Id. at 262; see FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
100. See infra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
101. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 263; see L. J. Vontz Constr. Co. v.
Alliance Indus., Inc., 215 Neb. 268, 272-73, 338 N.W.2d 60, 63 (1983); see also Quad/Graph-
ics, Inc. v. Fass, 724 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1983).
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are arguably inconsistent with testimony at trial is lying on the stand or
during a settlement discussion. Lying from the witness stand or during
settlement negotiations is a serious evil. But acknowledging that fact is
not where thinking about this matter should stop.
First, courts must ask how much the narrower interpretation of the
rule would affect real world behavior: how much less lying would there
be, and how much more often would lying be detected, if rule 408 were
construed to permit admission of statements that were made in settle-
ment negotiations solely on the ground that they arguably are inconsis-
tent with testimony offered at trial? Since there is no empirical study
that answers this question, we are forced to speculate. My speculation is
that adopting the narrower interpretation of the rule would have little
effect on lying. The psychological and other forces that lead people to lie
are probably sufficiently powerful in most instances to overwhelm
whatever fear might be engendered by the rather remote possibility of
exposure through admission of words uttered in settlement negotiations.
Most lawyers and litigants understand that only a small percentage of
cases reach the trial stage, so most counsel and clients probably would
believe that the odds are small that a lie committed during settlement
negotiations would be exposed at trial. Moreover, if a party lies during
settlement negotiations about a matter of any real consequence, it seems
unlikely that he would not repeat the lie at trial. If he repeats the lie, his
stories will not be inconsistent and the narrower interpretation of the rule
would not help expose his dishonesty.
There is some possibility that parties might be truthful during settle-
ment negotiations but untruthful at trial. The odds of that scenario oc-
curing often with respect to important issues seem small, however,
because the pressure to be truthful at trial is much greater than it is in the
informal, off-the-record settlement negotiations. Moreover, most settle-
ment negotiations are conducted almost exclusively by counsel and not
by the clients. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, the stories that would
be compared for impeachment purposes would be (1) the story told by
the client at trial and (2) the story told by his lawyer in settlement discus-
sions. It is not clear that courts would permit impeachment of aparty's
trial testimony by words uttered earlier by his lawyer in private efforts to
compromise the claim. In sum, it is questionable whether the narrower
interpretation of the rule would contribute to the goal of deterring or
detecting perjury at trial or lying during settlement negotiations.
On the other hand, the broader interpretation of the rule, which
would bar evidence of settlement communications if the only ground for
admission was arguable inconsistency between statements in settlement
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negotiations and testimony at trial, might promote positive ends by en-
couraging parties to share, during settlement discussions, more of the
reasoning and evidence that supports the offers or demands they make. I
hasten to concede that just as it is not clear how much a narrow interpre-
tation of rule 408 discourages or exposes lying, it also is not clear how
much a broad interpretation of the rule would improve the openness and
rationality of settlement discussions. The absence of empirical data
forces courts to make educated guesses on both sides of the debate. I
fear, however, that fair consideration has not been given to the argu-
ments that support a broader interpretation of the rule. Such considera-
tion might begin by acknowledging that it is not true that only liars need
fear an interpretation of rule 408 that would permit admission of state-
ments made in negotiations solely on the ground that they are arguably
inconsistent with trial or deposition testimony. Human thought
processes and forms of communication are so imperfect that there is a
substantial risk that parties whose hearts are as pure as the driven snow
will make statements at different times and in different contexts that are
arguably inconsistent. In other words, since being perfectly consistent is
virtually impossible, a rule that permits use of statements simply because
they are not perfectly consistent would lead to massive penetration of
settlement talks and could be used to penalize the pure of heart just as
much as the unscrupulous. The choice clearly is not between protecting
liars and exposing liars. Rather, the choice is between (1) an interpreta-
tion of the rule that might, to some unmeasured extent, deter some lying
by permitting party opponents to expose it when negotiations do not lead
to settlements, and (2) an interpretation of the rule that would give some
reality to its promise of confidentiality and that might, to some unmea-
sured extent, make settlement negotiations more rational by encouraging
parties to share the reasoning that supports their positions. Given the
lack of evidence that the narrow view of the rule has any effect on lying,
courts should reject that interpretation on the ground that it makes rule
408 hollow and misleading and creates pressures on counsel and litigants
that tend to defeat the rule's purposes.
B. Negativing a Contention of Undue Delay
By its own terms, rule 408 does not compel exclusion of settlement
communications if they are proffered for the purpose of "negativing a
contention of undue delay." Parties are most likely to want to use settle-
ment communications for this purpose when the opposition is asserting
that the doctrine of laches should bar their claim. As both Wigrnore and
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Professors Wright and Graham point out,102 however, often it will only
be the existence of negotiations that is relevant, not the content of the
parties' statements during the discussions. Lawyers who are trying to
limit disclosures from the negotiations should press this point on the
judge. On the other hand, the content of statements made during the
negotiations would be relevant and admissible, barring protection from
some other rule such as rule 403, if plaintiff contended that he had failed
to press forward because of specific promises defendant made during
their settlement talks. For example, this may occur where there is evi-
dence that the defendant told the plaintiff not to file suit because the
defendant would make the plaintiff whole without the necessity of resort-
ing to the court system.
In contrast, parties will rarely be able to use an opponent's assertion
of a defense based on the statute of limitations to justify introducing evi-
dence from settlement negotiations. The obstacle, however, would not be
rule 408, but rule 402's requirement of relevance.10 3 Under most statutes
of limitations, "the fact that one was attempting to compromise the dis-
pute is usually no excuse for failure to file the complaint or to take
whatever steps are required to comply with the statute." ° 4 An exception
to this generalization might arise when the evidence from the negotia-
tions suggests that the defendant had affirmatively induced the plaintiff
not to file his claim by making false promises to pay or otherwise correct
the situation. When a defendant's request or promise reasonably induces
the plaintiff not to file within the statutory period, the plaintiff might well
be able to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel to make the evidence
relevant. 105
Courts have permitted parties to use evidence of settlement negotia-
tions to excuse failures to begin efforts to mitigate damages promptly, or
to rebut a defendant's contention that the plaintiff's delay in stopping
work under a contract showed that the plaintiff did not believe that the
defendant had breached.10 6 Similarly, a defendant is likely to be permit-
ted to introduce evidence that during settlement negotiations it offered to
102. See C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 272 (citing WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 1061 n.43 (1972)).
103. FED. R. EvID. 402.
104. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 271.
105. Id. at 283.
106. See, e.g., California & Haw. Sugar Co. v. Kansas City Terminal Warehouse Co., 602
F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (company sold sugar to alternate buyer while negotiations
progressed, resulting in greater damages due to drop in market price); Urico v. Parnell Oil Co.,
708 F.2d 852, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1983) (plaintiff incurred additional loss of use damages while
negotiating with insurer over who would pay for truck repair); C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM,
supra note 14, at 272, 283.
July 1988] SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
reinstate the plaintiff when the purpose of the evidence is to show that
the plaintiff did not mitigate his damages. 107
C. Wrongful Acts During Negotiations
Rule 408 will not block admission of evidence from settlement nego-
tiations if the purpose of the evidence is to show that a party committed a
civil or criminal wrong or proposed illegal activity. For example, rule 408
would be no obstacle to introducing evidence that an offer to compromise
made by a defendant in an antitrust action consisted of an invitation to
join an illegal conspiracy. I0 8 Similarly, there is no reason to read rule 408
as barring evidence that a party attempted to extort another during set-
tlement negotiations. As suggested by Judge Weinstein, a former mem-
ber of the Advisory Committee on the evidence rules, courts also should
admit evidence from settlement negotiations that shows a libel, an as-
sault, or an unfair labor practice during the negotiations themselves.109
Evidence from settlement negotiations may be used in other con-
texts. Parties may use such evidence to help prove the failure of an insur-
ance carrier to make a good faith settlement within policy limits."l 0
Evidence from settlement negotiations also might be used to help prove a
claim of attorney malpractice, or as part of a lawyer's effort to prove that
he is entitled to a fee that a former client is wrongfully refusing to pay. I I
There is also authority for the view that a grand jury investigating crimi-
nal charges may subpoena evidence about settlement negotiations in an
earlier civil lawsuit." 12 This exception finds support in rule 408's express
permission to use evidence from settlement negotiations to prove "an ef-
fort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution."' 13
A significant variation on this theme can arise when some members
of a putative class object to a proposed settlement of a class action. An
important Seventh Circuit opinion held that "the conduct of the negotia-
107. See Thomas v. Resort Health Related Facility, 539 F. Supp. 630, 637-38 (E.D.N.Y.
1982) (discrimination in employment not cause of damages after reinstatement offer).
108. Cf Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 518 F.Supp 413, 414-16 (N.D.N.Y. 1980)
(Clayton Act provides an exception to rule 408 as regards consent decrees or nolo contendere
pleas in antitrust actions; exception is necessary to allow use of past antitrust conduct in en-
forcing law).
109. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 408-428 (1975).
110. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 396, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 90 (1970) (construing an earlier version of analogous state law, CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1152).
111. C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 282.
112. See In re Special Nov. 1975 Grand Jury, 433 F.Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D.Ill. 1977)
(subpoena duces tecum issued to Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.).
113. FED. R. EVID. 408.
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tions [is] relevant to the fairness" of a proposed class settlement.1 14
Therefore, members of a class that seek to block approval of such a set-
tlement are entitled to conduct discovery or examinations into how the
negotiations were handled, including inquiry into alternative offers that
may have been considered and potential conflicts of interest of counsel
who led the settlement negotiations on behalf of the class.115 The court
noted that the "seemingly irregular conduct of the negotiations" raised
real questions about whether those who had purported to represent the
members had done so adequately and whether the terms of the proposed
agreement were unfair to some of the people who would be included.
116
D. To Prove or Block Enforcement of an Alleged Settlement Contract
Rule 408 does not bar the use of evidence from settlement negotia-
tions if the purpose is either (1) to prove that an agreement was reached
and should be enforced, or (2) to defeat enforcement of an apparent
agreement. For example, the rule will not prevent a party from introduc-
ing evidence from the negotiations to show that a settlement contract was
procured by fraud 1 7 or was the product of duress or mutual mistake.
There are some circumstances, however, in which counsel may be
able to forestall such suits. Counsel may incorporate a release into the
settlement contract that specifically announces that in deciding to enter
the agreement neither party is relying on "any inducements, promises or
representations" that are not set forth with particularity in the settlement
contract itself. The Ninth Circuit recently relied, in part, on such lan-
guage to deny a sophisticated commercial entity an opportunity to prove
that a settlement and release were obtained through the intentional fraud
of an opponent. 118 Courts presumably would be more reluctant to per-
mit such language to foreclose an effort to set aside a settlement between
parties of substantially unequal bargaining power and sophistication.
Moreover, state statutes may prevent general release language (as op-
posed to language that specifically identifies certain events or documents
out of which no future claims could be made) from extinguishing "claims
which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor at the
time of executing the release, which if known by him must have materi-
ally affected his settlement with the debtor."11 9
114. Oswald v. General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 (7th Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 1123-25.
116. Id. at 1124.
117. See Gorman v. Soble, 120 Mich. App. 831, 842, 328 N.W.2d 119, 124-25 (1982)
(construing the parallel state rule).
118. Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1445 (9th Cir. 1986).
119. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1542 (West 1982).
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E. State of Mind
Although there are innumerable other purposes for which counsel
might seek to introduce evidence from settlement negotiations, one has
been upheld over objections based on rule 408 so often that it warrants
specific mention. Courts often have admitted evidence of settlements or
from settlement negotiations to help prove the state of mind or the
knowledge of a party to those negotiations. In Breuer Electric Manufac-
turing v. Toronado Systems of America, Inc.,120 for example, the court
held that evidence from settlement negotiations that occurred before fil-
ing a complaint was admissible to rebut an assertion by defendant that it
had not been aware of an issue until the suit was filed. In United States v.
Gilbert, 121 the Second Circuit upheld a trial court's decision to admit a
consent decree entered by defendant with the Securities Exchange Com-
mission when the purpose of the evidence was to show the defendant's
knowledge of securities reporting requirements. Similarly, the Third Cir-
cuit has admitted evidence from settlement negotiations to show that a
police department knew that a particular officer had violent
propensities.12
2
Most reported opinions seem quite liberal in admitting evidence
from settlement negotiations to prove or rebut contentions about a
party's state of mind or knowledge. At least one court, however, has
viewed this kind of reasoning as perilously close to permitting the use of
such evidence to prove the validity of a claim itself. In Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Maryland v. Hudson United Bank, 12 3 the court refused to admit
evidence of an earlier settlement with a non-party that was proffered to
show that the defendant knew about alleged employee dishonesty earlier
than it contended at time of trial. The court reasoned that admitting the
evidence for such a purpose was tantamount to admitting it to establish
the validity of the plaintiff's underlying claim.1
2 4
III. Rule 403: An Additional Source of Protection
Rule 408 does not purport to compel courts to admit evidence of
settlement whenever that evidence is offered for some purpose other than
to prove liability or damages. Rather, in such situations the rule simply
does not compel exclusion of the evidence. Rule 408 also does not pur-
port to prevent counsel from invoking other rules of evidence to attempt
120. 687 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1982).
121. 668 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1981).
122. Gagliardi v. Flint, 564 F.2d 112, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
123. 493 F. Supp. 434, 444-45 (D.N.J. 1980).
124. Id.
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to block admission of settlement material. When rule 408 does not com-
pel exclusion, counsel should look to Federal Rule of Evidence 403 as an
independent potential source of protection.1 25
Rule 403 provides that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. 126
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the Advisory Com-
mittee's note to this rule states that the other rules in article IV, which
include rule 408, "reflect the policies underlying" rule 403 and consist of
"concrete applications evolved for particular situations."1 27 Thus, rule
408 is a sub-species of rule 403, and the kind of analysis required by rule
403 is appropriate to decide whether evidence from settlement negotia-
tions should be excluded under rule 403 even though it is not barred by
rule 408.
Before turning to the case law that supports this view, it is impor-
tant to describe a strong argument by analogy from rule 404(b). Rule
404(b), also in article IV, is one of the "concrete applications [of the kind
of balancing generally called for in rule 403] evolved for particular situa-
tions." 1 28 The structure of rule 404(b) parallels the structure of rule 408.
Both begin by prohibiting admission of specified kinds of evidence for a
specified purpose, then go on to announce that courts are not required to
exclude the kind of evidence the rule covers if it is offered for a purpose
other than the one proscribed. Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of evi-
dence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith."1 29 In its
second sentence rule 404(b) states that such evidence "may ... be admis-
sible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or acci-
dent." 30 Explaining how courts should proceed when "the rule does not
require that the evidence be excluded" because it is offered for a purpose
that is not prohibited, the Advisory Committee's note declares:
No mechanical solution is offered. The determination must be
125. See, e.g., Weir v. Federal Ins. Co., 811 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1987); infra notes 134-54
and accompanying text.
126. FED. R. EVID. 403.
127. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
128. Id.
129. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
130. Id.
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made whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative
value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof
and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under
Rule 403.131
Thus, for a rule that also is in article IV, and that is structured just like
rule 408, the Advisory Committee makes it clear that courts should con-
duct an independent analysis under rule 403 after they conclude that the
concrete application provided for in a particular rule does not require
exclusion. 132
The Fifth Circuit proceeded exactly in this manner in United States
v. Cook. 133 Significantly, the evidence that generated the dispute con-
sisted of a consent decree and supporting documents that resulted from a
settlement of a prior civil lawsuit. 134 Thus the court arguably could have
adverted to the policies supporting rule 408 in addition to relying on rule
404(b). Neither party sought to draw support from rule 408, though,
and the court did not raise the issue. The court did state clearly, how-
ever, that even if the evidence was not barred by rule 404(b) because it
was proffered for a purpose other than the purpose proscribed, its admis-
sibility "remains subject to the balancing test of rule 403. The probative
value of the evidence under consideration must be determined and com-
pared with the danger of unfair prejudice occasioned by its admission,
error being found when it is clear that the latter substantially outweighs
the former."1 35 Applying this test, the Cook court concluded that the
trial court had committed reversible error by admitting the consent de-
cree documents. 136 Since the reasoning in support of this conclusion was
colored substantially by the special concern for protecting a defendant's
rights in a criminal trial, however, 137 the implications of this holding for
civil litigation are not clear.
As the Cook court suggested, and as the Advisory Committee's note
makes clear, the kind of analysis that is appropriate under rule 403 con-
sists of "balancing the probative value of and need for the evidence
against the harm likely to result from its admission."1 38 In conducting
this kind of analysis, courts may consider, among other things, the
"availability of other means of proof" and whether the evidence would
131. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
132. Id.
133. 557 F.2d 1149, 1153-55 (5th Cir. 1977).
134. Id. at 1151.
135. Id. at 1153 (citing FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee's note; United States v.
Catano, 553 F.2d 497, 499-500 (5th Cir. 1977)).
136. Id. at 1155.
137. Id. at 1153-54.
138. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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have "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, com-
monly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."1 39 Olin Corp. v. In-
surance Co. of North America 140 is instructive in this context. In that
case, the court refused to order pretrial disclosure of settlement docu-
ments, reasoning in part that representatives of the party seeking discov-
ery had participated in the settlement discussions and thus would be in a
position to impeach erroneous testimony about those discussions without
discovery of the documents.141 Interestingly, the Olin court did not cite
rule 403; instead, the court based its holding on the implications of rule
408.142
Given the strength of the common-law view that an offer of compro-
mise sheds light only on a party's desire to terminate litigation, not on its
assessment of the merits of an opponent's underlying position, counsel
should be able to argue persuasively in many environments that evidence
of an offer of compromise is of little or no probative value.143 Simultane-
ously, counsel can argue that admission of an offer of compromise would
create a huge risk of unfairly prejudicing the party who made the offer
and of confusing and misleading the jury-risks that could not be elimi-
nated by limiting jury instructions. Moreover, if a court admitted evi-
dence from settlement negotiations, fairness would require giving
opposing counsel a full opportunity to explicate for the jury the context
in which the settlement statements or offers were made. This would ef-
fectively expand the litigation into collateral matters that would exacer-
bate the jury's confusion and fruitlessly lengthen the trial.
Counsel should add arguments based on the policy that informs rule
408: courts that admit evidence from settlement negotiations discourage
communication about settlement and impair the rationality of settlement
discussions, and thus help to defeat the policy of encouraging consensual
resolution of disputes. Admitting the proffered evidence would seriously
threaten these important interests. Since that evidence generally would
be of marginal probative value, it should be excluded.
While not numerous, there are several cases that clearly endorse the
propriety of using a rule 403 balancing analysis before deciding to admit
evidence from settlement that is not clearly barred by rule 408. In Weir
139. Id.
140. 603 F. Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
141. Idr
142. See id
143. See, eg., Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 499, 535-37
(E.D. Mich. 1974) (efforts to settle or compromise a claim, along with direct suggestions or
overtures of settlement, will not be received in evidence as an admission of liability on part of
the party making the offer).
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v. Federal Insurance Co., 144 the district court had conducted a rule 403
analysis of proffered settlement evidence and had decided to exclude the
evidence because "its relevance was outweighed by its prejudicial
value." 145 On appeal, the panel of Tenth Circuit judges explicitly upheld
the propriety of conducting such an analysis under rule 403.146 The re-
viewing court declared:
The prejudicial effect of allowing a jury to hear of the circumstances
surrounding the settlement of a claim was one of the concerns that
motivated the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence to absolutely
prohibit the use of evidence of a settlement to prove liability or the
amount of a claim. Fed. R. Evid. 408. Although Rule 408 does not
prohibit the admission of evidence of the circumstances surrounding a
settlement to prove something other than liability-such as voluntari-
ness-many of the same concerns about prejudice and deterrence to
settlements exist regardless of the purpose for which the evidence is
offered.
The district judge must weigh the prejudicial effect of such evi-
dence against the relevance of the evidence.147
Remanding the case for other reasons, the Weir court explicitly in-
structed the district judge to conduct a full balancing analysis of the prof-
fered settlement evidence under rule 403.148 While the Tenth Circuit
panel did acknowledge that the "exclusion of relevant evidence under
Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly," it also em-
phasized that the "decision to exclude (or admit) evidence under [rule
403] is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be
reversed by this court absent a clear abuse of discretion." 149
Several years earlier a different panel of Tenth Circuit judges had
more summarily endorsed this use of rule 403 in United Fidelity v. Law
Firm of Best, Sharp, Thomas & Glass.150 The appellate court upheld a
trial judge's decision under rule 403 to exclude testimony that "would
have revealed settlement efforts" in a related earlier case. The appellate
court noted that rule 403 confers considerable discretion on a trial judge
with respect to such matters and found no abuse of that discretion.' 5 '
Several cases provide additional, but less direct, support for the no-
tion that courts may use a rule 403 balancing analysis to decide whether




148. Id. at 1396.
149. Id.
150. 624 F.2d 145, 149 (10th Cir. 1980). Only Judge McWilliams participated in both
Weir and United Fidelity.
151. Id.
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to admit settlement evidence whose exclusion would not be compelled by
rule 408.152 In Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc.,153 the majority found a vio-
lation of rule 408, then focused on the extent of the prejudice to defend-
ant in deciding that reversal was necessary because of the trial court's
disclosure of the amount of a settlement with former codefendants. The
Kennon dissent argued that the appropriate analytical model in this situ-
ation consists of the balancing called for by rule 403. 154
In sum, it is entirely appropriate to invoke rule 403 to oppose the
admission of settlement evidence that rule 408 would not automatically
bar. As the arguments and authorities described above make clear, there
are many circumstances in which the interests that would be advanced
by exclusion clearly outweigh the benefits that might result from
admission.
IV. Discoverability vs. Admissibility: Is There a "Privilege"
for Settlement Communications?
Attorneys must be careful to distinguish pretrial discoverability
from admissibility at trial. Litigators cannot safely assume that state-
ments made during settlement negotiations that would not be admitted at
trial (by virtue of rule 408, or rule 403, or simply because they would be
irrelevant) are also immune from discovery. Courts attempting to resolve
the discoverability question must face issues and conduct analyses that
are quite different from the issues and analyses relevant when ruling on
the question of admissibility. Unfortunately for counsel, who would like
to be able to predict the likelihood that settlement communications will
remain confidential, the published opinions on discoverability of settle-
ment negotiations do not reflect a consensus about basic issues in this
area. As the paragraphs that follow make clear, some courts are sympa-
thetic with the need to preserve confidentiality even as against discov-
ery,15 5 while many others have ruled that settlement communications are
discoverable despite the policies that inform rule 408.156
Whether or not communications made during settlement negotia-
152. See, e.g., John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 635 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Cook, 557 F.2d 1149, 1152-55 (5th Cir. 1977); Stacey v. Bangor Punta
Corp., 620 F.Supp. 636, 637 (D. Me. 1985). The McShain court concluded that a trial judge's
decision to admit evidence of settlement with a former defendant to show bias of an expert
witness employed by that former party "was not an abuse of discretion 'so inconsistent with
substantial justice' as to require a new trial." John McShain, Inc., 563 F.2d at 635.
153. 794 F.2d 1067, 1070-71, 1075-78 (5th Cir. 1986).
154. Id. at 1076 (Thornberry, J., dissenting).
155. See infra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 172-217 and accompanying text.
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tions are discoverable may depend, in part, on whether courts will recog-
nize a "privilege" for settlement communications under rule 408 or
federal common law. This question is important because the scope of
discovery is defined as "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action."'157 It follows that if
communications made in connection with settlement are privileged, they
will fall outside the scope of discovery, even if they are relevant. While
no appellate court in the federal system has addressed this question di-
rectly, several district court opinions express or imply views on this mat-
ter. The majority view seems to be that settlement communications are
not "privileged" within the meaning of the rules that define the scope of
discovery. 158 The same question arises under analogous state statutes.
As discussed below, the only appellate court in California that has ad-
dressed this question also has concluded that there is no generalizable
"privilege" that shields settlement communications from discovery.15 9
A. Support for the Existence of a Settlement Privilege
The case law support for the view that rule 408, or its common-law
antecedent, creates a privilege is relatively thin and appears to represent
the minority view. At least one important opinion from a federal court
of appeal prior to 1975, when the Rules of Evidence became effective,
uses the word "privileged" when referring to settlement communica-
tions. 160 This reference, however, appears almost casual, not the product
of self-conscious analysis about the significance of the word privilege.
More recently, Judge MacMahon of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York appeared to endorse the
notion that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 creates a "settlement privi-
lege." This privilege would block discovery of communications related
to settlement unless the party seeking the discovery can show clearly that
rule 408 would not bar admission of the communications at a subsequent
trial. 16 Unfortunately, the only reasoning the court offers in support of
this conclusion is a cryptic suggestion that denying discovery of the prod-
uct of earlier settlement negotiations is necessary "in order to safeguard
the policy favoring settlements."' 162
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
158. See infra notes 172-217 and accompanying text.
159. See Covell v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 3d 39, 42, 205 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (1984).
160. See Edward Valves, Inc. v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 286 F.2d 933, 938 (5th Cir.
1961).
161. Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
162. Id. at 450; see Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), discussed
infra notes 211-19 and accompanying text.
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Two of the other opinions that support the argument that rule 408
creates or reflects a privilege offer a little more by way of explanation but
focus on the trial stage rather than on the discovery stage. Kennon v.
Slipstreamer, Inc., 163 presented the issue of whether or not a trial judge
had committed reversible error when, in explaining to the jury why cer-
tain defendants were no longer present, he disclosed not only the fact
that they had settled with the plaintiff but also the nominal amount for
which they were released. In support of his dissenting view that the trial
court had not committed reversible error, Circuit Judge Thornberry em-
phasized that rule 408 "is rooted in the policy of promoting settlement by
privileging settlements and settlement negotiations."' 64 When Judge
Thornberry insisted that the rule "is based on the privilege rationale,"
however, his purpose was not to argue against the discoverability of such
material, but to support his minority view that a party could effectively
waive the operation of rule 408 at time of trial by agreeing to the intro-
duction of its own settlement offer or demand. 165 Thus his dissenting
opinion lends only oblique support to arguments that rule 408 has cre-
ated a generalized privilege for settlement negotiations that protects them
from pretrial discovery.
Counsel will find a little more support for such an argument in the
rationale that supports Senior District Judge Marovitz's conclusion in
Dunlop v. Board of Governors. 16.6 This case presented the issue of
whether the court should strike an affidavit submitted in support of a
motion for summary judgment because the affidavit contained accounts
of positions the parties had taken in settlement negotiations.1 67 In ex-
plaining its decision to strike the affidavit, the court pointed out that the
purpose of rule 408 is "to encourage settlement and compromise negotia-
tions."1 68 The court then proceeded to argue that "[i]t is only through
such orderly and 'privileged' discourse regarding claims that this policy
is most effectively served, and only when the privileges thereby received
are strictly enforced will opposing counsel feel free to candidly and fully
set forth their proposed compromises." 
1 69
While these opinions in Kennon and Dunlop addressed issues raised
at the trial stage, the rationale that supports them surely is not irrelevant
to the question we face here, which is whether federal law, through rule
163. 794 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (5th Cir. 1986).
164. Id. at 1075-76.
165. Id.
166. 16 F.E.P. Cases 1116 (N.D. Ill. 1975).




408 or otherwise, creates a "privilege" that can offer settlement commu-
nications some protection from discovery. The root of the rationale in
each opinion is identical: if the law wants to encourage settlement by
encouraging frank negotiations, it is important to create an environment
in which counsel and parties can be fairly confident that what they say as
they negotiate, and the terms of any agreements they might reach, will
not be used against them later. Arguably, the law will fail to create such
an environment if settlement communications are discoverable simply on
a showing that "the information sought appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
170
A strong argument in favor of viewing rule 408 as creating a privi-
lege can be built from the principal purpose of this rule. Because its prin-
cipal purpose is to encourage settlement by encouraging "freedom of
communication with respect to compromise, even among lawyers," 1 7 1
rule 408 has something very important in common with traditionally rec-
ognized privileges. The principal reason the law cloaks communications
between attorney and client with confidentiality, for example, is to en-
courage clients to "tell all" to their lawyers. The traditional privileges, in
short, have been designed to open up lines of communication in certain
settings in which full communication will serve important societal inter-
ests. The fact that rule 408 is designed to serve a closely analogous func-
tion is a major argument in favor of viewing it as creating a privilege.
B. Support for the View that No Settlement Privilege Exists
The traditional privileges attach to communications between per-
sons who have ongoing, supportive, interdependent, nonadversarial rela-
tionships (e.g., between priest and penitent, husband and wife, doctor
and patient, lawyer and client). One purpose of the traditionally recog-
nized privileges is to strengthen these relationships, relationships that so-
ciety has an interest in fostering. Parties to settlement negotiations, in
sharp contrast, are by definition adversaries. While in a small percentage
of cases they may end up with ongoing relationships, society usually has
no independent interest in nurturing close ties between adverse litigants,
at least none that parallels the kind of societal interest that inspires the
traditional privileges. Because no special relationship that society is
committed to fostering is involved in most settlement negotiations, it can
be argued that a key rationale supporting traditional privileges is inappli-
cable to the kinds of communications covered by rule 408.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
171. FED. R. EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
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Additional arguments can be marshaled against the view that rule
408 creates a privilege. One such argument is that the rule purports to
apply only at the trial stage and offers no express protection against pre-
trial discovery of settlement communications. Another argument is that
by its own terms rule 408 erects no barrier to admission at trial of settle-
ment communications when the evidence is offered for any purpose other
than "to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount."
Thus the protection rule 408 offers is much more limited than the protec-
tion offered by a privilege like the attorney-client privilege. The attor-
ney-client privilege attaches automatically to certain kinds of
communications and can be penetrated only on an extraordinary show-
ing. Rule 408, however, does not come into play at all unless a party
wants to introduce the settlement communication at trial for the only
purpose that is forbidden by the rule. The rule alone is not a bar if the
party who wants to introduce the evidence can proffer any one of the
scores of other purposes that might make the evidence relevant. Since
rule 408 promises so much less, it cannot serve as the source of an expec-
tation of privacy that is nearly as strong as the expectation created by the
attorney-client privilege.
Another reason that might be cited by courts in declining to hold
that rule 408 creates a privilege lies in the fact that the legislative history
of rule 501172 strongly suggests that Congress did not want the Federal
Rules of Evidence to serve as a source of "privilege" law. As originally
submitted by the Supreme Court to Congress, article V of the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence contained thirteen rules, nine of which defined
specific nonconstitutional privileges that the federal courts would have
been required to recognize. 173 Another of these proposed thirteen rules
announced that federal courts could recognize only those privileges iden-
tified in the proposed rules or in some other act of Congress. 174 Signifi-
cantly, the prohibition against admission of settlement negotiations to
prove liability was not in this package of privileges. It was set forth not
in the article dealing with privileges, but in the article entitled "Rele-
vancy and Its Limits," in which it is presently located. Thus, it would
appear that the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court did not
consider the protection offered by rule 408 a privilege. Moreover, Con-
172. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7082; S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7058. Compare Proposed Rules of Evid., 51 F.R.D. 315,
356-83 (1971) with FED. R. EVID. 501.
173. See Proposed Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315, 356-83 (1971).
174. See H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7082.
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gress rejected the privilege rules as proposed by the Advisory Committee
and the Court and substituted in their place what is now rule 501, which
essentially provides that privileges in federal question cases "shall be gov-
erned by the [evolving] principles of the common law." Thus, Congress
in effect decided that the Federal Rules of Evidence should not be used to
establish or to change the scope of privileges. Since Congress rejected the
use of the Federal Rules for this purpose, it would seem difficult to argue
that rule 408 creates a privilege.
While they have not directly endorsed all the arguments described
above, several federal courts have concluded that there is no generalized
privilege that protects settlement communications from discovery.
Before discussing opinions whose reasoning would appear to apply to
cases of all kinds, it is important to discuss a Seventh Circuit opinion that
deals with the special problems associated with settlement of class ac-
tions. 175 In In re General Motors Corp., 176 the trial court had approved
settlement as to a subclass of plaintiffs after refusing to permit lawyers
for disgruntled class members to conduct discovery into how the negotia-
tions were handled by other lawyers who purported to represent the in-
terests of all members. The appellate court concluded that this refusal
constituted an abuse of discretion and reversible error. 177 The court
pointed out that, before approving proposed class action settlements, dis-
trict courts have a special responsibility to make meaningful inquiry into
their fairness.178 If lawyers for class members who did not have an op-
portunity to participate in the negotiations challenge this fairness, mean-
ingful review requires affording them an opportunity to discover "'the
options considered and rejected, the topics discussed, the defendant's re-
action to various proposals, and the amount of compromise necessary to
obtain a settlement.' ,'179
The court of appeals noted that there was "no convincing basis" for
an argument that the conduct of these class action settlement negotia-
tions "is protected from examination by some form of privilege."'' 80 The
court insisted that its ruling was consistent with the letter and spirit of
175. Presumably similar problems could arise in connection with any settlement that re-
quired court approval, e.g., "shareholder derivative suits, bankruptcy claims, antitrust suits
brought by the United States .... and any suits 'affecting the public interest.' " Janus Films,
Inc. v. Miller, 801 F.2d 578, 582 (2d Cir. 1986).
176. 594 F.2d 1106, 1124-25, 1131 (7th Cir. 1979).
177. Id. at 1131.
178. Id. at 1123.
179. Id. at 1125 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 1318, 1562 (1976)).
180. Id. at 1124 n.20.
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rule 408.181 It was consistent with the letter of that rule because, on its
face, rule 408 "only governs admissibility." 182 It was consistent with the
spirit of the rule, which seeks to promote settlement, because:
Participants in negotiations to settle class actions are aware that Rule
23(e) requires the trial court's approval of any settlement reached.
Moreover, they are or should be aware that the court will inquire into
the conduct of the negotiations .... To the extent that such inquiry
discourages settlements, it should only discourage those negotiated in
circumstances so irregular as to cast substantial doubt on their
fairness. 
183
In other words, the Seventh Circuit panel concluded that participants in
class action settlement negotiations had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, at least as against other members of the class. Where there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy, no privilege should attach.
Because no published opinion takes exception to the holding or rea-
soning of In re General Motors Corp., counsel who participate in class
action settlement negotiations should appreciate the substantial likeli-
hood that their words and deeds in that context are both discoverable
and admissible in a proceeding to assess the fairness of the proposed
agreement or the adequacy of the representation of the class. Similar
risks may attend any negotiations in which the court must approve the
terms of a purported settlement.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Financial Management
Corp, 1 84 a First Circuit panel held that the common-law right of access
reaches financial statements submitted in confidence as part of a negoti-
ated consent decree and that the parties resisting disclosure of these doc-
uments had failed to make the compelling showing that would be
required to overcome this common-law right. The Standard Financial
court accepted the premise that a common-law right of access attaches to
all documents considered by a court "in the course of adjudicatory pro-
ceedings." s18 5 The court then held that a judge's consideration of a pro-
posed consent decree constitutes an "adjudicatory proceeding." 
186
According to the court, even when the proposed decree already has been
hammered out through private settlement negotiations between a govern-
mental agency and private parties, the trial court retains a responsibility
to "make its own inquiry into the issue of reasonableness" before it can
181. Id
182. Id
183. Id (citation omitted).
184. 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987).
185. Id
186. Id at 408-10.
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put its imprimatur on the decree as proposed.18 7 In the case at hand, the
district court had relied on the confidential financial statements "in as-
sessing the reasonableness of the order, i.e., in determining the litigants'
substantive rights, and in performing its adjudicatory function. The com-
mon-law presumption of public access therefore attached to them."1 88
The court went on to hold that a party who attempts to overcome the
common-law right of access must make a compelling showing and that
the courts should prohibit public disclosure (in this case to a newspaper)
only when the interests that would be served by sealing the documents
clearly outweigh the policy and tradition that support the public right of
access. 189 In the case at hand, the First Circuit upheld the trial court's
decision to unseal the financial documents even though they had been
submitted to the governmental agency as part of settlement negotiations
on the assumption that they would remain confidential. En route to its
holding the court noted that the "appropriateness of making court files
accessible is accentuated in cases where the government is a party: in
such circumstances, the public's right to know what the executive branch
is about coalesces with the concomitant right of the citizenry to appraise
the judicial branch." 190
Two of the most important cases outside the class action environ-
ment that hold that settlement communications are not privileged from
discovery involved the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).191 Because
the opinions in these cases obviously were influenced by the policies
favoring disclosure that inform the FOIA, it may not be safe to assume
that these courts would adopt the same posture in cases in which the
target of the discovery is not the federal government and the FOIA is
irrelevant. 192 Neither court, however, limited its holding that rule 408
does not create a generalized discovery privilege.193 Thus, on their face,
these opinions apply across the board.
District Judge Hogan wrote the first of these two opinions in Center
187. Id. at 408.
188. Id. at 410.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); see NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Department
of Justice, 612 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1985); Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice,
576 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1983).
192. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 612 F. Supp. at 1146-47; Center for Auto
Safety, 576 F. Supp. at 742 n.5, 748-49; see also infra notes 234-325 and accompanying text
(discussing FOIA's role in efforts to discover settlement communications from the federal
government).
193. See NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 612 F. Supp. at 1146; Center for Auto
Safety, 576 F. Supp. at 748.
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for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice.194 Because it has been cited
with approval in subsequent opinions from other courts, the pertinent
passage from this opinion warrants full reproduction here:
Moreover, the argument that a 'settlement negotiation' privilege is au-
thorized under F.R.E. 408 is also misplaced. The cited rule limits a
document's relevance at trial, not its disclosure for other purposes [cit-
ing 2 Weinstein's Evidence Par. 408 (1)]. The protection afforded by
Rule 408 is far less broad than the DOJ asserts. While its intent is to
foster settlement negotiations, the sole means chosen to effectuate that
end is a limitation on their [sic] admission of evidence produced during
settlement negotiations for the purpose of proving liability at trial, not
the application of a broad discovery privilege. Otherwise parties
would be unable to discover compromise offers which could be offered
for a relevant purpose, i.e., proving bias or prejudice of a witness, op-
posing a claim of undue delay, proving an effort to obstruct a criminal
investigation or prosecution, or enforcing a settlement agreement. 195
This interpretation of rule 408 is arguably inconsistent with the Ad-
visory Committee's note, which indicates that excluding evidence of set-
tlement negotiations as irrelevant is not as "consistently impressive" as
the rationale that focuses on the importance of promoting settlement by
encouraging "freedom of communication with respect to compro-
mise."' 196 The Center for Auto Safety passage in effect reverses the posi-
tion taken by the Advisory Committee by slighting, or discrediting
altogether, the privilege rationale for rule 408 and restoring the pre-rule
408 predominance of considerations of relevance. Moreover, the para-
graph cited from Judge Weinstein's treatise lends no real support to this
reversal because that paragraph only makes the obvious point-a point
made in the text of rule 408 as well-that a party cannot hide relevant
facts simply by presenting them in a settlement discussion before they are
requested in discovery, a principal that applies to all privileges.
While Center for Auto Safety is not faithful to the reordering of ra-
tionales for rule 408 that is suggested by the Advisory Committee, the
opinion is consistent with the structure of the rule itself. In fact, the
reasoning in Center for Auto Safety exposes the central difficulty that
arises from the kind of compromise between competing concerns that
rule 408 embodies. The compromise in the rule consists of the decision
to make settlement communications inadmissible only for limited pur-
poses-to prove liability for, the invalidity of, or the amount of damages
from a claim-clearly leaving open the possibility that courts could ad-
194. 576 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1983).
195. Id at 749.
196. FED. IL EvID. 408 advisory committee's note.
July 1988]
mit this same kind of evidence for any of a large number of other
purposes.
By leaving open the possibility that settlement communications
could be admitted for any one of an almost limitless number of other
purposes, the drafters of the rule in essence eviscerated the privilege ra-
tionale that they purported to find so "consistently impressive" and that
they intended to make the principal underpinning of the newly formu-
lated rule. The protection of rule 408 virtually evaporates; there are so
many conceivable purposes for which settlement communications might
be admissible, and counsel easily can argue that they cannot determine
whether there is some permissible purpose for which the communications
might be admissible at trial unless they can discover their contents. 197
The Center for Auto Safety opinion shows that the drafters constructed a
rule that is unfaithful to its own rationale. To truly serve the privilege
rationale, a rule would have to offer at least presumptive protection from
both discovery and admissibility in most circumstances (perhaps analo-
gous to the protection offered by the work product doctrine as it applies
to material that does not reflect a lawyer's mental impressions or legal
theories). By adopting the much more limited approach reflected in rule
408, the drafters made results such as those reached in Center for Auto
Safety virtually inevitable.
Several other reported opinions support the notion that there is no
generalized "privilege" for settlement communications. In NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 198 for
example, the court paraphrases part of the key passage from Center for
Auto Safety to justify the conclusion that rule 408 "was never intended to
be a broad discovery privilege."' 199 Examples of opinions that reach the
same conclusion on the privilege issue but do not rely on Center for Auto
Safety include Triax Co. v. United States20° and Manufacturing Systems,
Inc. v. Computer Technology, Inc. 201 In an opinion issued just before rule
408 became effective, Judge Charles Richey concluded that while settle-
ment communications "are clearly not admissible at trial for a number of
public policy reasons, such negotiations do not fall within the confines of
197. See, e.g., Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139-40 (D.R.I. 1986), discussed infra
notes 203-13 and accompanying text.
198. 612 F. Supp 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (FOIA case).
199. For a similar use of Center for Auto Safety, see Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83-8958
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
200. 11 Ct. Cl. 130, 134-35 (1986).
201. 99 F.R.D. 335, 336 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
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the privileges recognized at common law. '202
Judge Selya's recent opinion in Bennett v. La Pere203 reflects the
most aggressive assault on the notion that settlement communications
should be at least presumptively privileged from discovery. The court
addressed "whether a nonsettling defendant in a civil action may compel
disclosure of an accord reached between the plaintiffs and (former) code-
fendants." 204 The court first faced the question whether or not the re-
maining defendant could show that the settlement documents met the
"liberal view of the standards of relevance applicable in discovery pro-
ceedings. '205 The judge answered this question in the affirmative. Signifi-
cantly, he pointed out that rule 408 bars admission of such material only
for limited, specified purposes, leaving open the possibility of admissibil-
ity for other purposes, 20 6 and that there is "no satisfactory way for the
[remaining defendant] to determine whether it can slip within the integu-
ment of the Rule 408 exception unless it gains discovery access to the
settlement documents." 20 7 The court confirmed the implication of this
observation, noting that "in our adversary system" the only fair way to
reach a conclusion about whether there might be a permissible use of the
settlement documents at trial is to compel their disclosure in
discovery.20
8
Having thus concluded that it would be virtually impossible to block
discovery of such material on grounds of irrelevance, the Bennett court
asked whether there were any other considerations that "might militate
against disclosure.' 2 9 In particular, it discussed whether some policy
consideration reflected in rule 408 should either bar discovery of the set-
tlement materials or, short of creating an absolute bar, lead courts to
require parties who seek discovery of such material to make some show-
ing of justification or need beyond satisfying the liberal relevance stan-
dard of rule 26(b). 210 Rejecting the reasoning and conclusion in Bottaro
v. Hatton Associates,211 the court held that nothing in rule 408's language
or purposes justifies a conclusion that it creates any special obstacles to
discovery. In finding that the settlement documents in question were
202. Oliver v. Committee for the Re-Election of the President, .66 F.R.D. 553, 556
(D.D.C. 1975).
203. 112 F.R.D. 136 (D.R.I. 1986).
204. Id. at 137.
205. Id at 139.
206. Id at 139 n.1.
207. Id. at 139.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 140.
211. 96 F.R.D. 158 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); see infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
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"not privileged" and were discoverable, the court relied not only on the
fact that rule 408 applies only to admissibility at trial, but also on his
argument that compelling disclosure of the terms of a completed settle-
ment could not adversely affect the policy goal of encouraging settle-
ments. 212 In making the latter argument the court asserted that the only
fear that might inhibit settlement, and that rule 408 attempts to assuage,
is the fear that a pretrial settlement proposal would be used against the
party who made it during a subsequent trial in the same case.
213
The one fear that the court in Bennett was willing to acknowledge is
not the only fear that rule 408 is designed to assuage, as the courts in
Bottaro v. Hatton Associates,2 14 and Weissman v. Fruchtman2 15 recog-
nize. The Bennett opinion misconstrues rule 408 in part because it ac-
cepts an unrealistically narrow view of the several different ways that fear
of disclosure could impair the settlement dynamic. If the only fear the
drafters of rule 408 wanted to combat was fear that the terms of a settle-
ment proposal would be used against the party who made the proposal,
they would have written the rule much more narrowly than they did. If
combating this fear had been their only objective, the drafters certainly
would not have extended the protections of the rule to evidence "of con-
duct or statements made in compromise negotiations." The Advisory
Committee's note leaves no room to question the reason the drafters ex-
panded the common-law doctrine through the rule to cover "admissions
of fact" and other statements made during settlement discussions: the
drafters believed that the "inevitable effect" of the narrower common-law
approach had been "to inhibit freedom of communication with respect to
compromise, even among lawyers."' 216 The rule was designed to en-
courage communication about a broad range of settlement-related mat-
ters, not just about offers or demands.
Common sense supports the drafters' broader vision. The Bennett
court's approach would enable counsel to exchange only offers and de-
mands and would reduce "negotiations" to irrational volleys of numbers.
It is hard to understand how a law that encourages only the exchange of
numbers, with no regard for the reasoning or the evidence that supports
those numbers, could contribute much to fostering settlement. It takes
no genius to see that a rule that offers some protection to lawyers who
share the reasoning underlying their positions will contribute much more
212. Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 139-40.
213. Id. at 141.
214. 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
215. No. 83-8958 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
216. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
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to the prospects for settlement than a rule that permits only mechanical
and sterile exchanges of bottom lines. Moreover, adopting rules whose
effect is to reduce the negotiation process to mere number swapping de-
grades our system in fact and in the eyes of litigants who are forced to
use it.
The Bennett court also mistakenly assumed that the purposes of rule
408 are fiully satisfied once a settlement agreement has been reached by
some or all of the parties to a particular action.217 What people say in
negotiations to settle one lawsuit may well be relevant to other litigation
in which they are involved or in which they fear they might become in-
volved. I have hosted many settlement conferences during which parties
have expressed concerns about related cases or parallel situations involv-
ing nonparties, or in which one party has been unwilling to settle unless
it is assured that the terms will not be disclosed to others who might be
encouraged to file new claims or hold out for more money in cases al-
ready docketed. It is naive not to recognize that lawyers and litigants are
constantly concerned about how their statements or actions in one set-
ting might come back to haunt them in other settings. If courts construe
rules so as to increase the circumstances in which communications made
during negotiations can be discovered or admitted into evidence, they
create inhibiting forces that reinforce the instinct parties and lawyers al-
ready have to play their cards as close to their chests as possible.
C. A Test for Discoverability that Appropriately Reflects the Policy
Objectives
For the reasons just described, I disagree strongly with the Bennett
court's suggestion that it is appropriate to decide whether negotiation
material is discoverable simply by using the same kind of analysis that
courts would use for any other nonprivileged matter. Although it may
be fair to say that rule 408 does not create a privilege, the rule clearly
reflects a significant federal policy in favor of promoting settlements by
encouraging freedom of communication that is not implicated by most
discovery requests. This policy would be seriously jeopardized if courts
routinely permitted discovery of communications made in settlement dis-
cussions. Counsel seeking to protect settlement materials from discovery
should argue vigorously that courts should order disclosure only after
conducting a balancing analysis in which the federal policy of promoting
settlement is given the full weight it deserves.
Case law supports this balancing approach. For example, in Bottaro
217. Bennett, 112 F.R.D. at 140.
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v. Hatton Associates,218 the opinion Judge Selya attacked in Bennett, the
court declared:
Given the strong public policy of favoring settlements and the congres-
sional intent to further that policy by insulating the bargaining table
from unnecessary intrusions, we... require some particularized show-
ing of a likelihood that admissible evidence will be generated by the
dissemination of the terms of a settlement agreement.
219
In Weissman v. Fruchtman,220 the court quoted this passage from Bottaro
with approval. The court relied on it to justify blocking a party's access
to settlement materials when he could not make a clear showing that
these materials would be admissible at trial or lead to discovery of admis-
sible evidence. In effect, the Bottaro and Weissman courts reversed the
presumption that the Bennett court indulged in favor of discovery. The
Bennett court held that a party must have discovery access to settlement
materials in order to determine whether they might be admissible on
some theory that would not be barred by rule 408.221 The Bottaro and
Weissman courts, in contrast, insisted that because free discovery access
to such materials would threaten the policy objectives of rule 408, courts
should protect these materials unless a party can make a persuasive
showing that such materials are likely to be admissible or to lead to sig-
nificant other evidence.
222
Groton v. Connecticut Light & Power223 further supports the ap-
proach endorsed by Bottaro and Weissman. In Groton, the court used a
balancing test to determine whether to permit discovery that might inter-
fere with ongoing settlement negotiations. 224 The court made clear that
it would prohibit discovery of this kind where the potential prejudice to
the settling parties outweighed the need for disclosure. 225
Even without Bottaro, Weissman, and Groton, lawyers would be on
solid ground in asking a court to conduct a balancing analysis before
permitting discovery of confidential settlement communications. Federal
courts conduct exactly this type of balancing analysis when a party seeks
a protective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Rule
218. 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
219. Id.
220. No. 83-8958 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
221. Bennett v. La Pere, 112 F.R.D. 136, 139 (D.R.I. 1986).
222. 603 F. Supp. 445, 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158,
160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Weissman v. Fruchtman, No. 83-8958 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1986)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database); cf Olin Corp.v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 603 F. Supp. 445,
449-50 (discovery of terms of insurance agreement denied in order to safeguard the policy
favoring settlements).
223. 84 F.R.D. 420, 423 (D. Conn. 1979).
224. Id. at 422-23.
225. Id. at 423.
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26(c) clearly contemplates the courts' making particularized judgments
comparing the potential utility of requested information with the harm
that might be done if the information were disclosed. 226 Rule 26(c) also
expressly empowers courts to enter orders that certain discovery not be
conducted at all, or that "certain matters not be inquired into, or that the
scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters," or that "trade se-
cret or other confidential research, development, or commercial informa-
tion not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way."'227 Rule
26(c) obviously acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which
the interests that support preserving the confidentiality of certain mate-
rial will outweigh the interests that might be served by permitting discov-
ery of this material.
Thus, even if federal courts refuse to hold that rule 408 creates a
"privilege," they should afford settlement material an extra level of pro-
tection from routine discovery by conducting a balancing analysis in
which the federal policy reflected in rule 408 is given the full weight it
deserves. Courts should acknowledge that the public policies reflected in
rule 408 create a substantial presumption against discovery of settlement
material. Moreover, courts should permit rebuttal of this presumption
only after a strong showing that the competing interests clearly outweigh
the interests and the policies favoring confidentiality and that the com-
peting interests cannot be satisfied in some other, less intrusive manner.
The only authority in this subject area is from a California court and
points, albeit somewhat unclearly, in the direction of Bottaro and its
progeny. In Covell v. Superior Court,228 the appellate court considered
section 1152 of the California Evidence Code, 229 which served as a model
for Federal Rule of Evidence 408230 and affords the same kind of protec-
tion to settlement negotiations as the federal rule. The court concluded
that the section does not create a privilege, relying entirely on one fact:
section 1152 is not located in the division of the California Evidence
Code that defines "privileges. '231 While this reasoning is not profound,
it may be sufficient.
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (giving court discretion to grant a motion for protective order
where "good cause shown," and "which justice requires to protect a party or persons from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense"). See, eg., Glick v. Mc-
Kesson & Robbins, Inc., 10 F.R.D. 477,479 (D. Mo. 1950); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1983
amendments) (describing general scope and limits of discovery).
227. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(4), (7).
228. 159 Cal. App. 3d 39, 205 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1984).
229. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1988).
230. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
231. Covell, 159 Cal. App. 3d at 42, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Section 1152 appears in the
division that sets out evidence affected by or excluded for policy reasons.
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The Covell court went on to hold, however, that the settlement ma-
terial was not discoverable, even though it was not privileged, because
the party seeking it had failed to show that it was "reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. '232 Most significantly,
the spirit in which the court reviewed the relevance arguments seems
more demanding than one would normally expect at the discovery stage.
The appellate court took the unusual step of finding that the trial court
had abused its discretion when it ordered disclosure of the material.233
The appellate court's willingness to take this unusual step supports an
inference that, under California law, judges will impose a more demand-
ing standard for discovery of settlement material than they would for
discovery of material that is unprotected by the kinds of public policies
reflected in section 1152 of the California Evidence Code.
D. Settlements with Public Entities: Public Right of Access
Lawyers who represent public entities in settlement negotiations, or
private parties who decide to enter a settlement agreement with a public
entity, must be aware of the possibility that interested persons could use
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),234 or a state law equivalent like
the California Public Records Act,2 35 to force disclosure of both the
terms of a settlement agreement and other documents related to settle-
ment negotiations. This section focuses primarily on the applicability of
the FOIA to materials generated in connection with settlement negotia-
tions conducted by agencies of the federal government. It also includes a
discussion of the only major opinion from a California appellate court
that addresses the applicability of California's Public Records Act to an
effort by a third party to compel disclosure of the terms of a settlement
entered by a local government with a tort claimant.
236
FOIA contains no exemption that explicitly mentions materials gen-
erated in connection with settlement negotiations. Because of this, and
the general admonition that courts are to construe FOIA's exemptions
narrowly and to resolve doubts in favor of disclosure, 237 there are cir-
cumstances in which citizens can use FOIA to force governmental agen-
232. 159 Cal. App. 3d at 43, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
233. Id.
234. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
235. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West Supp. 1987).
236. Register Div. of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. App. 3d
893, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1984).
237. Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 741 n.2 (D.D.C.




cies to disclose documents generated in connection with settlements.238
The reported decisions suggest that documents related to settlement ne-
gotiations will be deemed exempt from FOIA if they have not been dis-
closed to or received from an adversary.2 39 These decisions also suggest,
however, that documents disclosed to or received from an adversary dur-
ing confidential settlement negotiations are vulnerable to a FOIA re-
quest, regardless of the nature of the interest that inspires the request.24°
Among the nine exemptions from FOIA, the one that seemed most
promising to lawyers trying to preserve the confidentiality of settlement
documents was number five, which covers "inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda or letters which would not be available by law to a party
other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 241 This exemption
protects government-generated documents whose confidentiality the gov-
ernment has maintained and which satisfy the criteria for any clearly
established privilege. For example, this exemption would prevent use of
FOIA to compel disclosure of a document the government generated in
connection with settlement negotiations if the document satisfied the cri-
teria for the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.242
Similarly, the fifth exemption applies to documents that would be pro-
tected from disclosure in civil litigation by the "deliberative process"
privilege. 24
3
On several occasions government lawyers have tried unsuccessfully
to persuade courts that there is a separate "settlement privilege" in civil
litigation and that materials that would qualify for it also should fall
within the protections of the fifth exemption.244 The seminal case is
238. FOIA applies only to documents. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
239. This is true provided that documents also fit into some existing privilege or constitute
work product. See, eg., CenterforAuto Safety, 576 F. Supp. at 748; see infra notes 241-43 and
accompanying text.
240. For authority for the proposition that analysis of access rights under FOIA is not
contingent on the nature or intensity of the requesting citizen's interest, see County of
Madison, 641 F.2d at 1040-41. See also National Labor Relations Board v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1975).
241. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
242. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Department of Health and Human Serv.,
623 F. Supp. 301, 305-07 (M.D. Pa. 1985); Murphy v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 571 F. Supp.
502, 506-07 (D.D.C. 1983).
243. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 623 F. Supp. at 305-07; Murphy, 571 F.
Supp. at 504-06.
.244. See County of Madison, N.Y. v. Department of Justice, 641 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir.
1981); NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 612 F. Supp.
1143 (D.D.C. 1985); Norwood v. Federal Aviation Admin., 580 F. Supp. 944 (W.D. Tenn.
1984); Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1983).
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County of Madison, New York v. United States Department of Justice. 245
In that opinion, Chief Judge Coffin, writing for a unanimous panel, or-
dered the government to disclose documents generated in connection
with settlement negotiations in an earlier, related matter. 246 The docu-
ments in question had either been sent by the party opponent to the gov-
ernment or by lawyers for the government to opposing counsel during
the course of the negotiations. 247 The appellate court refused to catego-
rize these documents as "intra-agency" memoranda or letters.2 48
The court also rejected an argument that FOIA empowers federal
courts, under the guise of exercising equitable discretion, to decide
whether considerations of "public policy" justify adding exemptions to
FOIA for categories of documents not specifically exempted by Congress
on the face of the statute.249 The court acknowledged the importance of
the government's ability to resolve disputes by settlement and conceded
that the government's ability to reach consensual agreements with adver-
saries in litigation would be impaired if parties knew that under FOIA
"'written settlement communications will be available to anyone, irre-
spective of the merit of his or her need to know. ' 250 The County of
Madison panel felt constrained, nonetheless, to honor the letter and spirit
of FOIA, which they emphasized "is not a withholding statute but a
disclosure statute."' 251 The court ruled that the public policy favoring
settlement simply cannot justify distorting FOIA's language and giving
courts discretionary power to limit the statute's disclosure mandate by
carving out an exemption that is not even intimated in that language.
252
The effect of County of Madison is clear: exemption five will not protect
documents related to settlement that were generated by or shared with a
party opponent, even if both the government and its opponent intended
all such documents to remain confidential.
Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice253 followed and in
some measure extended the reasoning of County of Madison. The former
case arose when the Center for Auto Safety attempted to use FOIA to
force the Justice Department (DOJ) to disclose documents it had shared
with or received from the "big four" American auto manufacturers dur-
245. 641 F.2d 1036 (1st Cir. 1981).
246. Id. at 1039, 1041.
247. Id. at 1040-41.
248. Id. at 1040-42.
249. Id. at 1041.
250. Id. at 1040.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1041.
253. 576 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1983).
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ing the course of negotiations to modify a consent decree entered in an
antitrust action.254 In the end, the court rejected the Justice Depart-
ment's arguments that these documents were exempt from disclosure
under either exemption five or exemption seven of FOIA.
255
First, the court ruled that memoranda or letters exchanged' by the
government and the consent decree defendants could not be considered
"intra-agency" documents within the meaning of exemption five.256 The
court rejected the argument that entry of the original consent decree
somehow converted the auto makers into the equivalent of independent
contractors working with the government to ensure that the public inter-
est was satisfied.257 Instead, the court insisted that the auto makers re-
mained adverse parties and thus that communications between them and
the DOJ could not be considered "intra-agency. '' 258 This ruling applied
even to drafts of consent decrees prepared by DOJ lawyers and accompa-
nying memoranda, both of which included comments and notations that
reflected, among other things, "the mental impressions and views of vari-
ous agency personnel. ' 259 Drawing on Coastal States Gas Corp. v. De-
partment of Energy,26° Judge Hogan held that documents that might
otherwise be protected can be swept within the scope of FOIA once they
are shown to adversaries because in so doing the governmental agency
can be deemed either to adopt the documents as its position on an issue
or to use them "in its dealings with the public."' 261 The court articulated
its holding clearly: "[w]hile these documents may at one time have been
used for internal advisory purposes and would therefore be protected,
when the DOJ elected to use them as tools in their negotiations with the
public [the defendants] they lost their internal status, and their qualifica-
tion for Exemption 5."262
In a significant part of the opinion, the court held that even if the
documents in question somehow could be deemed "intra-agency" they
would not satisfy the second requirement of exemption five-that they
would be protected by some privilege that would have protected them
254. I at 741.
255. Id. at 747, 754-55. Exemption seven protects documents "compiled for law enforce-
ment purposes" from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982) (current version at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1988)).
256. Center for Auto Safety, 576 F. Supp. at 748.
257. Id at 745-46.
258. Id at 745-47.
259. Id at 747.
260. 617 F.2d 854, 866 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
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against an adverse party if the agency had been involved in litigation.263
Noting that there is a "presumption against recognizing new discovery
privileges under Exemption 5,''264 Judge Hogan concluded that "there is
no clear congressional intent to include a settlement negotiation privilege
within Exemption 5" and that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 neither ac-
knowledged nor created any such privilege.265 According to the court,
since there is no clearly established "settlement negotiation privilege,"
the mere use of documents in settlement negotiations does not mean that
they "would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the
agency," as required by the second clause of exemption five. 266
In combination, County of Madison and Center for Auto Safety stand
for this proposition: Exemption five will not protect documents related
to settlement unless they have not been shared with or received from an
adverse party and they meet all the requirements of a clearly established
discovery privilege. The County of Madison court did make a suggestion,
however, to which government counsel should attend. Relying on Fed-
eral Open Market Committee v. Merrill, 267 the court implied that FOIA
could not be used to acquire these kinds of materials, even when shared
with an adverse party, if counsel had persuaded a court to enter a protec-
tive order making the settlement negotiations and the documents related
thereto confidential. 26 Counsel practicing in the Second Circuit should
be able to rely on this method of protecting confidentiality, 26 9 but those
practicing in the Third Circuit cannot assume that sealing orders will
protect such material.
270
The Center for Auto Safety court disposed of the government's argu-
ments under exemption 7A with comparable dispatch. 271 Congress re-
cently expanded this exemption, 272 but apparently not in ways that
would eviscerate County of Madison's reasoning or dislodge its conclu-
sion. To qualify under exemption seven, even as amended, the docu-
ments must have been "compiled for law enforcement purposes" and
263. Id. at 748.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 749.
266. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982).
267. 443 U.S. 340, 362 (1979).
268. Center for Auto Safety v. Department of Justice, 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C.
1983).
269. See infra notes 300-33 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 334-55 and accompanying text.
271. 576 F. Supp. at 749-55; see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1982) (current version at 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(7)(A) (West Supp. 1988)).
272. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Supp. IV 1986).
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satisfy at least one of six other criteria. 273 The case law suggests that a
document will not be deemed to have been generated "for law enforce-
ment purposes" unless it was created in connection with an investigation
that focused on "'specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particu-
lar identified officials, acts which if proved result in civil or criminal sanc-
tions.' ",274 Most documents generated in connection with efforts to settle
civil litigation will not satisfy this requirement.
In 1984 and 1985 two federal district courts followed the lead of the
County of Madison and Center for Auto Safety opinions in refusing to
acknowledge a "settlement negotiation privilege" under exemption five
and ordered governmental agencies to disclose terms of settlements or
settlement-related documents that had been shared with an adversary.
275
These two cases are Norwood v. Federal Aviation Administration276 and
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. v. United States De-
partment of Justice.
277
Norwood adds an important factor to the exemption five analysis.
Pointing out that "the Supreme Court has held that 'final dispositions' of
matters by an agency can never be exempt under exemption 5,"'278 Nor-
wood announced that "the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] can-
not use exemption 5 to withhold production of the settlement agreements
themselves, since the settlement agreements represent the final disposi-
tion of an agency case." 279  Whether or not other courts will find this
reasoning persuasive is difficult to predict, but counsel should be aware
that exemption five might offer no protection at all to the final terms of
settlement agreements.
The Norwood opinion discusses an additional exemption that might
apply to some settlement documents. Exemption six covers "personnel
and medical files and similar fies the disclosure of which would consti-
tute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. '280 In Norwood,
a lawyer who represented 170 terminated air traffic controllers was using
the FOIA in an effort to gain access to settlement agreements and related
documents between the FAA and controllers reinstated after the nation-
273. Id
274. Center for Auto Safety, 576 F.Supp. at 750 (quoting Rural Housing Alliance v. De-
partment of Agric., 498 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
275. Apparently there are no opinions that contradict this line of authority.
276. 580 F. Supp. 994, 1002-03 (W.D. Tenn. 1984).
277. 612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985).
278. 580 F. Supp. at 1000 (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 153-54
(1975)).
279. Id
280. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1982).
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wide strike in 1981.281 District Judge Horton declared that in order to
qualify for exemption six the government would have to show three
things: "(1) that the requested information is properly classified as a 'per-
sonnel,' 'medical,' or 'similar' file [and not simply put in a personnel file
to shield it from the scope of FOIA]; (2) that the release of the informa-
tion would violate substantial privacy interests of those involved; and (3)
that the privacy interest is not outweighed by the public interest in dis-
closure. ' 282 The court concluded that the removal letters and the settle-
ment agreements had been properly classified as "personnel" matters, but
that the government had failed to carry its burdens with respect to the
remaining two requirements.2 83 In concluding that the documents had
to be disclosed, the court made it clear that it would hold government
counsel to demanding standards with respect to the second and third
requirements, thus implying that it would be difficult to use exemption
six to avoid disclosure of settlement documents.284
Other exemptions to the FOIA might, in rare cases, protect docu-
ments related to settlement,28 5 but as far as I am aware only one of these
other exemptions is the subject of a reported opinion in which a court
ruled on an effort to discover materials related to settlement negotiations.
In Parker v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,286 Judge
Robinson, relying on exemption three, rejected an effort to use the FOIA
to compel the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
disclose "all predetermination settlement agreements and conciliation
agreements made in the Commission's Philadelphia Regional Office dur-
ing March, 1974."287 Exemption three covers agency records that are
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute," as long as the statute
in question meets specified criteria.2 88 The court held that these docu-
ments qualified for exemption three even though the statute that governs
EEOC procedures does not mention these kinds of documents, and the
statute would impose a duty of confidentiality only on negotiations that
occur after the Commission has found reasonable cause to believe that a
charge of an unlawful employment practice is true. The significance of
281. Norwood, 580 F. Supp. at 996-97.
282. Id. at 998.
283. Id. at 998-99.
284. Id.
285. For example, exemption four covers "trade secrets and commercial or financial infor-
mation obtained from a person and priviledged or confidential." 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4) (1982).
286. 534 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
287. Id. at 979.
288. 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3) (1982) (the exempting statutes must be framed so as to leave no
discretion on the question of disclosure, or must either refer to the particular types of matters
to be withheld or establish particular criteria for withholding).
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the latter point is that "predetermination settlement [agreements] are en-
tered into after a charge is filed but before any determination of reason-
able cause by the Commission. ' 289 Despite these technical difficulties,
both the District Court and the appellate court were satisfied that Con-
gress intended to place a cloak of confidentiality around all types of in-
formal negotiations conducted by the Commission and all of the
agreements that such negotiations produced.290 Both courts concluded
that Congress had elevated the public interest in fostering settlement of
EEOC claims, by extending a promise of confidentiality, above the public
interests generally reflected in the FOIA.291 Thus, both the predetermi-
nation settlements and the conciliation agreements are "specifically ex-
empted from disclosure by statute" within the meaning of exemption
three. No other reported opinion has interpreted this exemption with
respect to settlement agreements.
The extent to which state law analogues to the FOIA might be used
to force disclosure of settlement materials is not at all clear. In fact, only
one reported opinion by a California appellate court even addresses this
question. That opinion suggests that attorneys who negotiate settlements
with or on behalf of public agencies in California cannot safely assume
that the terms of the deals they strike will remain confidential. In Regis-
ter Division of Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange,292 the ap-
pellate court affirmed a trial court's ruling that California's Public
Records Act 293 entitled a newspaper to access to virtually all of the docu-
ments related to a confidential settlement of a tort claim brought by a
prison inmate against a county government. The court explicitly con-
cluded that the public agency's promise to the plaintiff to maintain the
confidentiality of the negotiations and of the terms of the agreement was
insufficient to overcome the statutory mandate of public access to the
records involved.
294
Holding that the terms of the settlement itself, as well as most re-
lated documents, had to be disclosed, the court of appeal made some
sweeping pronouncements that seem to reflect little sympathy for the no-
tion that confidentiality can be a key to the success of the settlement
process. Among other things, the county defendant had argued that dis-
closure of settlement documents would encourage people to file frivolous
289. 534 F.2d at 979.
290. Id at 980-81.
291. Id at 978, 980.
292. 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1984).
293. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West Supp. 1987).
294. 158 Cal. App. 3d at 909-10, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
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claims and would compromise the public body's freedom to decide that it
was in the taxpayer's best interests to offer a nuisance value settlement
rather than incur the much greater expense of defending a case through
trial and appeal.29 5 "Against this interest," responded the court:
must be measured the public interest in finding out how decisions to
spend public funds are formulated and in insuring governmental
processes remain open and subject to public scrutiny. We find these
considerations clearly outweigh any public interest served by con-
ducting settlement of tort claims in secret, especially in light of the
policies of disclosure and openness in governmental affairs fostered by
both the CPRA and Brown Act. While County's concern with the
potential for escalating tort claims against it is genuine, opening up the
County's settlement process to public scrutiny will, nevertheless, put
prospective claimants on notice that only meritorious claims will ulti-
mately be settled with public funds. This in turn will strengthen public
confidence in the ability of governmental entities to efficiently adminis-
ter the public purse.
296
In a footnote that apparently was intended to offer some reassurance
to public bodies, the court added a potentially significant, but unclear,
limitation on the implications of this paragraph: "Plaintiff does not
claim, nor do we hold, every discussion regarding settlement of an actual
or potential case against the county should be made public. We limit the
scope of our holding to the actual discussion and actions of the claims
settlement committee."
297
Because the Register court's analysis turned almost entirely on Cali-
fornia statutes, the law that emerges from this lengthy opinion is binding
only in California courts.298 Counsel working in other states must deter-
mine whether their states have statutes comparable to California's Public
Records Act.
V. Alternative Methods of Enhanced Protection
of Settlement Negotiations
In light of the numerous threats to the confidentiality of settlement
communications previously discussed, the following section presents a
number of alternative approaches counsel can consider in order to pro-
tect settlement negotiations from disclosure. Part A will discuss the use
295. Id. at 909, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 909 n.13, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 102 n.13.
298. It would also be binding on a federal court whose jurisdiction was premised solely on
diversity of citizenship if the court were to decide, under principles announced in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, that it was bound to follow California law on
this kind of question.
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of protective orders or sealing orders. Part B discusses side agreements
under seal. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and recently enacted state
mediation statutes are the subject of part C. Finally, part D discusses the
enforceability of private contracts between settling parties to ensure
confidentiality.
A. Protective or Sealing Orders
A protective or sealing order entered by a federal court apparently
will prevent interested persons from being able to use FOIA to force dis-
closure of settlement agreements and related documents. The court in
Center for Auto Safety stated, "[l]n the antitrust decree modification con-
text, the DOJ is in the position of petitioning the supervisory court for a
protective order under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(c) which
would qualify as a per se discovery privilege and bar to disclosure under
FOIA. '299 Other authorities suggest that the protections from FOIA
that are available through protective or sealing orders are not limited to
antitrust or consent decree settings.
3°°
One technical, but apparently sufficient, reason that court orders
can protect documents otherwise discoverable under FOIA is that this
statute reaches only "agency" records, 30 1 and courts generally do not
consider themselves to be "agencies" within the meaning of the stat-
ute.30 2 Thus, settlement documents that become court documents are
simply outside the purview of the FOIA.
30 3
The most explicit consideration of this issue occurred in the trial
court and affirming appellate court opinions in In re Franklin National
Bank Securities Litigation,304 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v.
Ernst & Ernst.305 These opinions resulted from an effort by the Public
Interest Research Group (PIRG) to use FOIA to force disclosure of the
terms of a settlement agreement between the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), the trustee for the bankrupt Franklin National
Bank, and its accountant, Ernst & Ernst.30 6 PIRG launched this effort
some two years after District Judge Jack B. Weinstein had entered an
299. 576 F. Supp. 739, 749 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing Federal Open Mkt. Comm. v. Merrill,
443 U.S. 340, at 362 n.24 (1979)).
300. See, eg., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
301. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) (1982).
302. See Tigar & Buffone v. Department of Justice, 590 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (D.D.C.
1984).
303. See United States v. Charmer Indus., Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1170 n.6 (2d Cir. 1983).
304. 92 F.R.D. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
305. 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
306. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec Litig., 92 F.R.D. at 471.
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order, at the parties' request, sealing the settlement documents and com-
manding the parties to maintain the confidentiality of the terms of the
agreement. 30 7 PIRG first presented its request for information about the
settlement to the FDIC, invoking the FOIA.30 8 Relying on the court's
order, the FDIC rejected the request. 30 9 Thereafter, PIRG petitioned
Judge Weinstein to vacate the order sealing the documents and compel-
ling confidentiality.
310
The court rejected PIRG's argument that "a court's order to a fed-
eral agency to withhold agency records from the public is limited to the
reasons for withholding permitted in the FOIA. ' '311 Judge Weinstein rea-
soned that the goals of the FOIA are:
not necessarily defeated when an agency obtains protection from a
court which is broader than the FOIA exemptions. The Act was in-
tended to circumscribe the discretion of agencies rather than that of
courts. In the context of this case it cannot be said that the FDIC
manipulated this court in order to avoid the agency's obligations under
the FOIA. Rather, the court properly issued a not unusual protective
order in aid of its own jurisdiction.
312
In a subsequent section of the opinion Judge Weinstein emphasized
that it was not the FDIC, but private litigant Ernst & Ernst, that insisted
on the confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement and the
court order sanctioning it.313 The court might have been less confident
about the implications of the FOIA for such a sealing order if the party
who took the initiative and had the principal interest in seeking the order
had been the federal agency that otherwise would have been constrained
to disclose the terms of the agreement.
After rejecting the FOIA argument, the trial court considered the
merits of PIRG's petition to modify the sealing order. 314 It balanced the
interests that would be served by disclosure against those that had been
advanced by sealing the settlement documents initially and those that
would be harmed by withdrawing the protection of confidentiality after
the parties had relied on it for two years. 31 5 This balancing analysis ac-
knowledges that there might be some circumstances in which a court
307. Id.
308. Id. at 470.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 471.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 472.
314. Id. at 471-72.
315. Id.
[Vol. 39
could be persuaded to "unseal" a settlement agreement. 316 PIRG, how-
ever, failed to persuade the judge to exercise his discretion in favor of
disclosure.317 In conducting its balancing analysis, the court emphasized
how much time and resources were saved by the settlement of this mas-
sive case and the fact that one of the private parties absolutely refused to
enter a settlement unless its terms were sealed. 318 Thus, "[w]ithout se-
crecy of the terms, a settlement would not have been consummated.
'31 9
When Judge Weinstein turned to the interests that would be harmed
by disclosure after the fact, he found substantial additional grounds for
denying PIRG's request. He noted:
The settlement agreement resulted in the payment of substantial
amounts of money and induced substantial changes of position by
many parties in reliance on the condition of secrecy. For the court to
induce such acts and then to decline to support the parties in their
reliance would work an injustice on these litigants and make future
settlements predicated upon confidentiality less likely.
320
In sum, the trial court found that "the strong public policy favoring set-
tlement of disputes, particularly in complicated cases, and the impor-
tance of the stability of judgments and settlements" outweighed the
interests that would be advanced by disclosure.
321
On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld Judge Weinstein's refusal to
modify the original sealing order "essentially for the reasons stated" in
his opinion. 322 The appellate panel agreed that courts could order agen-
cies to withhold documents even when no FOIA exemption covered the
material in question. 323 More specifically, the Second Circuit held that
"the FOIA does not apply to a court's order directing an agency not to
reveal the terms of an agreement crucial to the settlement of an ac-
tion. '324 The higher court also emphasized that after "a confidentiality
order has been entered and relied upon, it can only be modified if an
'extraordinary circumstance' or 'compelling need' warrants the requested
modification. '3
25
A different panel of Second Circuit judges revisited this general sub-
316. Judge Weinstein explicitly confirmed this possibility in In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740, 770 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).





322. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1982).
323. Id at 232.
324. Id.
325. Id
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ject three years later in Palmieri v. State of New York 326 The FOIA was
not involved in Palmieri. Instead, the issue was simply what kind of
showing was required to compel modification of existing protective or-
ders that had covered both settlement negotiations between private par-
ties and the terms of the settlement itself.32 7 What is particularly
interesting about the Palmieri opinion is that it reflects considerable
resistance to vacating such sealing orders even when the effort to pene-
trate the seal is being made by the Attorney General of the State of New
York and a state grand jury for the purpose of developing evidence of
possible criminal conduct arising out of the same circumstances that
were the subject of the earlier settled civil antitrust action.328 Even in
this situation, the Second Circuit held that the persons seeking to vacate
the sealing order must satisfy a demanding standard by showing either
that the original order was "improvidently granted" or that "extraordi-
nary circumstances" or a "compelling need" justified the modification.
329
The appellate court went on to suggest that none of the required
showings would be easy to make. For example, to establish that the seal-
ing order had been improvidently granted, the state attorney general
would be required to show that the issuing judge "reasonably should
have recognized a substantial likelihood that the settlement would facili-
tate or further criminal activity. ' 330 If the attorney general failed to
carry this burden, the parties' reliance on the sealing orders, "as evi-
denced by their unwillingness to engage in settlement negotiations with-
out the protections afforded, raises a presumption in favor of upholding
those orders. ' 331 Finally, the appellate panel pointed out that the attor-
ney general's ability to make the required showing of a "compelling
need" would be compromised, although not necessarily fatally, by the
fact that the government and the grand jury had at their disposal "special
investigatory powers not available to private litigants. '33
2
In sum, the tone of the Palmieri opinion is not hospitable to efforts
to vacate orders that created the environment of secrecy that was essen-
tial to conducting settlement negotiations and concluding an agreement.
Not surprisingly, the Second Circuit is not so inhospitable to such re-
quests when targets of criminal investigations attempt to use sealing or-
326. 779 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1985).
327. Id. at 862.
328. Id. at 863.
329. Id. at 866.
330. Id. at 865-66.
331. Id. at 865 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 677 F.2d 230, 232 (2d
Cir. 1982)).
332. Id. at 866.
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ders to prevent disclosure of corporate records that existed before
litigation commenced, before any protective order was sought, and before
settlement negotiations commenced.
333
A recent opinion by a divided panel of judges from the Third Circuit
contrasts sharply with the Second Circuit opinions in Palmieri and FDIC
v. Ernst & Ernst. As no governmental agency was involved in Bank of
America v. Hotel Rittenhouse Associates,334 the party seeking disclosure
of settlement documents could not rely on the FOIA. The two judges
who formed the majority in Hotel Rittenhouse, however, focused on a
doctrine that the Second Circuit opinions had ignored: The "common'
law right of access to judicial records and proceedings. '335 In fact, the
majority relied on this doctrine to overrule the District Court's refusal to
unseal settlement documents and other papers filed in a civil proceed-
ing.336 In so doing, the court not only reversed the presumptions favor-
ing sealing orders that are reflected in the Second Circuit opinions, but
went much further by holding that the interests advanced by promising
litigants that their settlement will remain confidential cannot outweigh,
at least absent some extraordinary showing, the common-law right of
public access to court documents. 337 As the majority phrased it, "the
generalized interest in encouraging settlements does not rise to the level
of interests that we have recognized may outweigh the public's common
law right of access."'338 Thus the majority made it clear that "the pre-
sumption of access" that attaches to sealed court documents is very
strong and that a party seeking to overcome this presumption, and thus
to maintain the confidentiality of such sealed documents, bears a heavy
burden indeed.
Because Judge Sloviter's opinion for the two-judge majority in Hotel
Rittenhouse is so explosive in implications and so inconsistent with recent
opinions from the Second Circuit, it is necessary to understand the con-
text in which it arose. This context may expose a basis for distinguishing
the case from situations more commonly arising in civil litigation. By
looking carefully at the context, one also can develop practical sugges-
tions for lawyers that should enable them to avoid the outcome reflected
in the Hotel Rittenhouse case.
Two aspects of the background against which Hotel Rittenhouse was
333. See United States v. Davis, 702 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983).
334. 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 921 (1987) (case captioned Bank
of Am. Nat'l Trust and Say. Assoc. v. FAB III Concrete Corp.).
335. Id at 343.
336. Id. at 344.
337. See id
338. Id at 346.
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decided seem to have been most important to the court's decision: (1)
the parties who entered the settlement decided to file the agreement,
under seal, and thus to make it formally a record in the case;3 3 9 and (2)
after filing the settlement agreement under seal, the parties began disput-
ing its meaning and, most importantly, each filed motions petitioning the
court to interpret and enforce the contract. 340 The District Court per-
mitted the parties to conduct their enforcement litigation entirely under
seal: their motions, cross-motions, responses and replies remained under
wraps, even when the court entered a judgment compelling one of the
parties to pay the other more than thirty-eight million dollars pursuant
to the contract and ordered the marshall to sell the subject commercial
property. 341 In the meantime, the concrete subcontractor for the project
was pressing an 800,000-dollar claim for work done on the property.3 42
This contractor filed an action in state court charging that the two par-
ties to the federal action had conspired to defraud him and that the seal-
ing of the settlement action was one of the acts they committed in
furtherance of their fraudulent scheme.343 The contractor's petition to
unseal the settlement agreement and the subsequent motion papers led to
the Hotel Rittenhouse opinion.
344
The Court of Appeals emphasized the fact that the parties had vol-
untarily elected to file their settlement in the District Court and then had
sought to use that court to achieve their private enforcement ends. 345
Judge Sloviter noted that the parties had an alternative that probably
would have enabled them to protect the confidentiality of their agree-
ment. "[I]t is likely," she wrote, "that had [the parties] chosen to settle
and file a voluntary stipulation of dismissal, as provided in Rule 41(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they would have been able to
prevent public, and even [the cement subcontractor's], access to these
papers. ' 346 But the filing of the settlement documents, even under seal,
made them part of the court record and, as such, "subject to the access
accorded such records.
'347
339. Id. at 344-45. The parties apparently took this step because they feared compliance
problems, and they wanted to improve the odds that the court would help them enforce the
terms of the contract in expeditious proceedings; they did not want to have to file a separate
action on the settlement contract and wait in line for trial of that matter.
340. Id. at 341, 344.
341. Id. at 341.
342. Id. at 340-41.
343. Id. at 341.
344. See id. at 340.
345. Id. at 345.
346. Id. at 344.
347. Id. at 345.
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In distinguishing the Second Circuit's opinion in Federal Deposit In-
surance Corp. v. Ernst & Ernst, 348 Judge Sloviter emphasized two factors.
The first, and apparently the more important, was that in the Hotel Rit-
tenhouse case, unlike in Ernst & Ernst, "there were motions filed and
orders entered that were kept secret, in direct contravention of the open
access to judicial records that the common law protects. ' 349 Driving the
point home, the court declared that "[h]aving undertaken to utilize the
judicial process to interpret the settlement and to enforce it, the parties
are no longer entitled to invoke the confidentiality ordinarily accorded
settlement agreements. ' 350 Judge Sloviter also distinguished Ernst &
Ernst by pointing out that it implicated interests of much greater public
import and of a much larger number of people than did the Hotel Ritten-
house matter.3 51 But because the cases were dissimilar, the two judges
who made up the majority in Hotel Rittenhouse refused to decide
whether the kind of showing of particularized need to maintain confiden-
tiality that had been made in Ernst & Ernst was sufficient to "override
the strong presumption of access. '3 52
From the structure of the court's opinion in Hotel Rittenhouse, it
appears that there are virtually no circumstances in which Judges
Sloviter and Aldisert would uphold the confidentiality of settlement doc-
uments and related papers when such materials have been the subject of
litigated motions, orders, and judgments. The odds that these two judges
would vote to preserve confidentiality appear to be somewhat better-but
still not good-when there has been no litigation about the terms of the
agreement and thus when the only court document that would remain
under wraps is the settlement contract itself.
The lesson to be learned from Hotel Rittenhouse should be clear:
lawyers practicing in the Third Circuit must decide whether preserving
the confidentiality of the terms of their clients' agreement is more impor-
tant than improved ability to enforce its terms. If preserving confidenti-
ality is the more important consideration, counsel in the Third Circuit
should not file their agreement. Instead, they should file a stipulated dis-
missal and rely on a separate action, sounding in contract, for enforce-
ment purposes.
Two additional points about the majority opinion in Hotel Ritten-
house remain to be made. The first arises from Judge Sloviter's emphasis
348. 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1982).
349. Id (emphasis in original).
350. Ia
351. Id. at 345-46.
352. Id at 346.
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that there might be two independent bases on which a party could seek
disclosure of sealed settlement documents. 353 The basis on which the
majority ruled in Hotel Rittenhouse was the "common law right of access
to judicial records and proceedings. '35 4 This common-law right gave
rise to the test used in the court's opinion: a balancing analysis in which
the scales are heavily weighted in favor of disclosure. Thus, the party
seeking to preserve confidentiality must overcome the "strong presump-
tion" in favor of access.
355
The second point to note is that the majority intimated, but refused
to formally decide, that the first amendment might offer parties a sepa-
rate, and independently sufficient, predicate for attacking the sealing of
settlement documents. 356 Moreover, Judges Sloviter and Aldisert sug-
gested that the "test" to which the first amendment might give rise in
situations like this might be even more difficult for parties resisting dis-
closure to survive. 357 That test apparently would parallel the "compelling
state interest" test developed by the Supreme Court for analyzing stat-
utes that restrict core political speech on the basis of its content.358 Vig-
orously applied, this test is virtually impossible to pass. The significance
of all this is that the court intentionally left open the possibility that even
if its reasoning under the common-law right of access were to be rejected
at some point in the future by the Supreme Court, it would have another,
even more powerful, doctrine to invoke to support the same conclusion.
Judge Sloviter's reasoning has at least two vulnerabilities that could
be used by counsel in other jurisdictions to persuade their courts not to
follow Hotel Rittenhouse. The first "soft spot" in Judge Sloviter's reason-
ing is her unpersuasive effort to distinguish the Supreme Court's opinion
in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 359 in which the High Court held that
the first amendment did not prevent a District Court from entering a
protective order sealing certain discovery documents. The Hotel Ritten-
house court argued that discovery "is ordinarily conducted in private"
and that the public somehow has a less powerful interest in access to
discovery documents than to a settlement agreement that is filed under
seal.360 In many courts, of course, discovery documents are routinely
filed and accessible to the public. Moreover, a number of settlement
353. Id. at 342-43.
354. Id. at 344.
355. Id. at 344-46.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 344.
358. Id.
359. 467 U.S. 20, 36-37 (1984).
360. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d at 343.
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agreements contain confidentiality clauses. As a general proposition,
there may be a greater expectation of privacy with respect to the terms of
settlement than there is with respect to discovery documents. For these
reasons, Judge Sloviter's effort to distinguish Seattle Times remains
unpersuasive.
The second problem with Judge Sloviter's opinion is her reliance on
the "common law right of access." This is a controversial, ill-defined and
unevenly supported doctrine, especially as it applies to civil litigation.
361
Lawyers searching for help in efforts to challenge the reasoning of
Hotel Rittenhouse may look to the essentially contemporaneous opinion
by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v.
Schumacher.362 Like Hotel Rittenhouse, Schumacher dealt with settle-
ment documents that had become part of the record of a civil action and
did not address unfiled settlement agreements. After considering the rel-
evant precedents from the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota decided in Schumacher that "no first amendment
right of access exists" in settlement documents. 363 In reaching this con-
clusion, the high court of Minnesota relied heavily on its perception that
"[h]istorically, the majority of settlements entered into between parties
have been private" and on its belief that allowing public access to settle-
ment documents might jeopardize the important policy objective of en-
couraging consensual disposition of lawsuits.
364
The Schumacher court went on to acknowledge, however, that even
though the first amendment -gives rise to no general right of access to
settlement docunents that are made a part of the record in civil actions,
the common law creates a presumption in favor of such access that can
be overcome only by showing "strong countervailing reasons why access
[to the filed settlement documents] should be restricted. ' 365 The court
promptly softened the implications of this position, however, by (1) an-
nouncing that the standard of review for decisions by trial judges over
whether to grant access to sealed settlement documents is abuse of dis-
cretion, and (2) holding that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
361. For a thorough and illusion-puncturing examination of the history and underpinnings
of this doctrine as it applies to discovery materials, I recommend Professor Richard L. Mar-
cus' article, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1983).
362. 392 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986). The Schumacher opinion was issued on August 8,
1986, exactly one month before the opinion in HotelRittenhouse. There is no reason to believe
that the Third Circuit panel that produced Hotel Rittenhouse was aware of the Schumacher
opinion.
363. Id at 204.
364. Id.at 204-05.
365. Id at 205-06.
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in refusing to permit a newspaper to have access to "settlement and dis-
tribution papers" and transcripts of settlement hearings in five wrongful
death actions against an airline that was being sued by other victims of
the same accident. 366 In affirming the trial judge's action, the Supreme
Court noted that the "historical and philosophical privacy of settlement
documents, along with the relevant facts and circumstances of this case,
demonstrate that the privacy interests asserted by the litigants were
strong enough to justify restricting access.
' 367
It is arguable that the effect of relying on the "historical and philo-
sophical privacy of settlement documents" is to eviscerate the strong pre-
sumption in favor of access that the court purported to acknowledge. If
the court permits the historical privacy of settlement to offset the pre-
sumption in favor of access, the "test" that emerges is an open balancing
(that is, not weighted in favor of any outcome). And if the scales are not
tipped at the outset significantly in favor of disclosure, trial courts will
enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether or not to permit access
to sealed settlement documents. In Schumacher, the trial court was satis-
fied by a showing that if the settlement documents were made public the
plaintiffs might be subjected to harassment, exploitation, and intrusions
on their privacy. 368 Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme
Court ascribed much countervailing weight in the balancing process to
the great public interest in the airline crash or to the pendency of other
litigation arising out of the same incident. In fact, the Supreme Court
used the level of public interest in the event and its aftermath to buttress
its conclusion that disclosure of the terms of the settlements might lead
to further intrusions on the privacy of the settling plaintiffs. 369
In spirit, Schumacher and Hotel Rittenhouse could not be more anti-
thetical. The Minnesota Supreme Court seems to be more sympathetic
than the Third Circuit with the goal of promoting settlement and with
the argument that affording real protection to the privacy of settlement
contracts is essential to that goal. By contrast, the Third Circuit ascribes
more weight to the importance of public access to records that show how
civil proceedings were closed. Which of the competing assumptions that
underlie these two approaches is wisest is a question to which we have no
empirical answer. Thus, the debate will continue at least until the
Supreme Court of the United States enters the fray.
366. Id. at 206.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 205, 206.
369. Id. at 205.
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B. Side Agreements Under Seal
Janus Films, Inc. v. Miller, 370 a recent Second Circuit opinion, ex-
poses a different kind of risk that lawyers face when they file a side agree-
ment under seal in connection with a consent judgment or a settlement
judgment. Janus Films was a copyright infringement action that the par-
ties purported to settle in open court on the second day of trial. The
proposed settlement included a concession of liability by the defendant,
an agreement that judgment would be entered "for statutory damages,
attorney's fees, and costs in the total amount of $100,000," and "a sepa-
rate, confidential agreement, to be placed under seal, regarding 'the terms
and conditions of collection' of the judgment. ' 371 The confidential side
agreement permitted the defendant to satisfy the monetary aspect of the
judgment by "payment of a sum considerably less than the $100,000 over
an extended period of time. ' 372 Despite the defendant's subsequent
change of mind and attempt to avoid the commitment he had made in
open court, the trial judge entered a judgment that described the
100,000-dollar obligation and certain injunctive relief, but did not men-
tion either the content or the existence of the side agreement.
373
The Second Circuit panel was not comfortable with the way the trial
judge had handled the side agreement. Noting that it was dealing with
an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals distinguished between:
a judgment that concerns only the parties to the lawsuit being settled
and a judgment likely to be of concern to others. The former, which
might be called a "private judgment," is illustrated by a judgment that
resolves the claims of all parties to a dispute involving a tort or a
breach of contract. The latter, which might be called a "public judg-
ment," is illustrated by the pending case, where a judgment resolves a
dispute concerning a copyright that may be enforced against other
members of the public besides the defendant in this litigation.
374
Because the case did not involve a "private judgment," the appellate
panel declined to consider whether -courts should permit parties in such
actions to terminate their suit through entry of a consent judgment or a
settlement judgment accompanied by a separate side agreement that iE
fied under seal.
375
With respect to "public judgments," however, the Janus Films court
announced a new rule. Noting that "there is always the distinct risk that
370. 801 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1986).
371. Id at 580.
372. Id
373. Id at 581.
374. Id at 584.
375. Id at 585.
July 1988]
either party may seek to induce others to settle similar disputes on terms
exactly like or at least similar to the terms of the judgment," the Second
Circuit held that parties who terminate litigation by having the trial
court enter a consent judgment or a settlement judgment should be re-
quired to disclose the content of any side agreements that are part of the
arrangement that concludes the suit.376 This holding does not mean that
parties cannot settle cases on confidential terms. As the Janus Films
panel pointed out, litigants who have settled their dispute retain the op-
tion of forgoing entry of judgment, terminating the case by a stipulated
dismissal, and "keeping confidential all aspects of their settlement. '377 If
terms of disposition are "likely to be asserted against other[s]," however,
the parties may not "secure a judicial imprimatur for an obligation that
[they have secretly] agreed means less than its terms state. ' 378
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and State Mediation Statutes
Attorneys who are especially concerned about preserving the confi-
dentiality of offers or demands, or of statements made during negotia-
tions, should consider proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
68, or a state law analogue, like section 998 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure, or turning to a "mediation" process that enjoys special
state statutory protection.
The bar to admissibility that is articulated in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68, and in section 998 of the California Code of Civil Proce-
dure, is virtually unqualified, in sharp contrast to the limited protection
offered by Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Rule 68 flatly declares that
evidence of an unaccepted offer that was made under the rule is "not
admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. ' 379 The language
of section 998 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is similarly
sweeping: "If such offer is not accepted ... it ... cannot be given in
evidence upon the trial. ' 380 These prohibitions seem operative regardless
of the purpose for which the evidence would be proffered at trial and thus
avoid the limitations on the scope of rule 408.381 Since neither rule 68
nor section 998 purports to extend protection to evidence of "conduct or
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 584-85.
379. Evidence that a rule 68 offer was made could be introduced after judgment at trial,
when the offeror attempts to recover his costs from a plaintiff who rejected a rule 68 offer that
turned out to be larger than the award at trial.
380. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West Supp. 1988).
381. See supra notes 57-124 and accompanying text.
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statements made in compromise negotiations, ' 38 2 counsel cannot be sure
to what extent these rules of procedure can be invoked to protect com-
munications that accompany and explain protected offers. Moreover, by
their express terms, these rules apply only to offers that are not ac-
cepted. 38 3 It is unlikely that these rules would offer any protection in a
case in which a person who was not a party to a settlement agreement is
attempting to compel disclosure of settlement communications or terms.
As an alternative to simple two-party settlement negotiations, coun-
sel could proceed with private mediations that are covered by recently
enacted state confidentiality statutes with much greater confidence in the
scope of the protection they afford. As one commentator has noted, re-
cent "legislative enactments in several states have provided near-absolute
protection for communications made in mediation, [thus greatly enhanc-
ing] the protection available to mediation under the traditional rules of
evidence and contract. ' 384 Some of the most populous states in the coun-
try, including California, New York, and Florida, have enacted such
laws.38
5
The California version of these statutes appears as section 1152.5 of
the Evidence Code, which was added in 1985. Except for certain family
law matters that are covered by other confidentiality provisions, this stat-
ute applies to any kind of civil dispute.386 When parties "agree to con-
duct and participate in a mediation for the purpose of compromising,
settling, or resolving a civil dispute," and when, before the mediation
begins, they agree in writing to invoke the protections of the statute after
setting forth the provisions of the statute in their agreement, the law pro-
hibits admitting evidence "of anything said or... any admission made in
the course of the mediation" or any "document prepared for the purpose
of, or in the course of, or pursuant to, the mediation.'
' 38 7
382. FED. R. EVID. 408.
383. See FED. R. Civ. P. 68 ("An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and
evidence therof is not admissable except in a proceeding to determine cost."); CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 998(b)(2) (West Supp. 1988) ("If the offer is not accepted prior to trial or
within 30 days after it is made, whichever occurs first, it shall be deemed withdrawn, and
cannot be given in evidence upon the trial.").
384. Note, supra note 3, at 452.
385. Id at 452 n.79; see CAL. EviD. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1988); see also MiNN.
STAT. §§ 572.31-.40 (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (Supp 1987) (offering a shield of
confidentiality to communications and documents connected with mediations except as needed
in an action "to have a mediated settlement agreement set aside or reformed"); see also Protec-
tive Order Limits Deposition of Privately Retained Mediators, Alternative Dispute Resolution
Rep. (BNA) 212-13 (Sept. 17, 1987).
386. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1988); see CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4351.5, 4607
(West Supp. 1988); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1747 (West 1982).
387. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 (West Supp. 1988).
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The Law Revision Commission's comment to the 1985 addition 388
makes clear that parties can waive their confidentiality rights under this
section either by failing to object to a proffer at the time of trial or by
mutual consent. The same comment points out that the purpose of this
section is "to encourage this alternative to a judicial determination of the
action" and that the justification for the confidentiality provision is the
same as the justification for the much narrower provision contained in
section 1152, which renders offers of compromise "inadmissible to prove
•.. liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.'"389 The Law Revi-
sion Commission's comment emphasizes that instead of attempting to
limit the applicability of the statute through a definition of the term "me-
diation," the legislature decided that it would make the statutory protec-
tions available only when "the persons who will participate in the
mediation (including the mediator) execute a written agreement before
the mediation begins stating that Section 1152.5 of the Evidence Code
applies to the mediation" and only when their agreement sets "out the
full text of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 1152.5."
Thus, California practitioners who want to take advantage of the
broad protections available through this statute should develop forms
that recite all the relevant provisions of the statute and that expressly
articulate the commitments to confidentiality that all parties and the me-
diator make. When they follow the proper procedure, California lawyers
should be able to use this statute to fill virtually any gap left by section
1152 of the California Evidence Code, which applies only to "offers to
compromise. '39
0
There is no reason to believe that because a dispute is already the
subject of litigation the protections of section 1152.5 are rendered inac-
cessible. There is reason to believe, however, that this more generous
section would not apply to negotiations between the parties that did not
involve a neutral third party. While the new statute does not purport to
define "mediation," it clearly contemplates a process that involves the
participation of a neutral person who must sign the confidentiality agree-
ment. Counsel cannot simply change the label of direct settlement negoti-
ations to "mediation" and assume that they will enjoy the protections of
the new statute, but must involve a neutral person from the outset.
Before deciding to proceed under section 1152.5, counsel should
consider the disadvantages that might derive from the breadth of its pro-
tections. As a commentator has pointed out concerning comparable stat-
388. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152.5 law revision commission's comment (West Supp. 1988).
389. Id.
390. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1152 (West Supp. 1988).
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utes enacted in other states, proceeding under statutes that on their face
bar use of evidence from mediations regardless of the purpose for which
the evidence would be used could create extra difficulties for a party who
subsequently seeks either (1) to enforce an agreement that resulted from
the mediation or (2) to resist enforcement of an agreement that was the
product of duress, fraud, mutual mistake, or overreaching. 391 Similarly,
the broad language of a statute like section 1152.5 could impair efforts to
redress wrongs arising out of violation of some specific duty relating to
the conduct of negotiations, such as the duty to bargain in good faith in
labor disputes, or the duty of an insurance carrier to consider in good
faith reasonable settlement proposals.
392
Apparently anticipating this problem, the Minnesota legislature ex-
plicitly provided that the promise of confidentiality that extends gener-
ally to communications made in connection with mediations does not
apply when a party applies to a court "to have a mediated settlement
agreement set aside or reformed. ' 393 Even though they acted a year later
than their counterparts in Minnesota, California legislators failed to add
any such caveat or qualifier to the promise of confidentiality in section
1152.5. Thus, counsel cannot be sure how California courts will respond
when a party attempts to use material or statements made in connection
with a mediation to enforce or to defeat a mediated settlement agree-
ment. Given this uncertainty, counsel must assess separately the needs
and risks presented by each specific situation that calls for some effort to
reach a settlement, then either (1) choose from the pre-existing proce-
dures394 the one that best fits that situation or (2) attempt to create,
through private contract, a mini-trial process that is specially tailored to
meet the needs of the parties.
D. Private Caucus Settlement Conferences
A private caucus settlement conference hosted by a judge or magis-
trate offers two sources of protection for communications. In confer-
ences structured on this model the parties have virtually no direct
interaction. The person to whom they present the reasoning that sup-
ports their offers or demands, and to whom they divulge how far they
might be willing to go in an effort to compromise differences, is the
391. See Note, supra note 3, at 452-54.
392. See id at 452-54.
393. MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1984).
394. Some of the alternatives include a judicially hosted settlement conference, a media-
tion, offers of compromise under rule 68 or section 998 of the California Civil Procedure Code,
or traditional face-to-face negotiations by the lawyers.
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judge-not opposing counsel. Furthermore, the parties can ask the judge
to keep secret the admissions or concessions about which they are most
sensitive, or the most potentially damaging reasons for the positions they
are taking. An opponent who does not learn these things cannot attempt
to introduce them at trial.
The second source of protection for communications made during
judicially hosted settlement conferences is the difficulty an opponent
would have compelling a judge who had hosted such a conference to
testify at trial about what a party said to her in confidence during the
negotiations. There may be circumstances under which this kind of testi-
mony could be compelled, but the judicial community is likely to require
a compelling showing before permitting a party to penetrate this sensitive
arena.
E. Using Private Contracts to Extend Protection
Another tool that counsel might consider using to increase protec-
tion for their settlement communications is a contract with the opposi-
tion designed explicitly for the purpose of guaranteeing confidentiality.
In such a contract, the parties might commit themselves not to attempt
to introduce at a trial on the merits, for any purpose, any statements
made during settlement negotiations. Such a contract clearly would
reach farther than rule 408 and erect a stone wall instead of a split rail
fence between settlement negotiations and trial. Such contracts, of
course, cannot bind parties who do not sign them and may have little
effect on the capacity of a non-party to discover or introduce at trial the
settlement communications covered by the contract. 395
Unfortunately, the enforceability of such contracts is not always
clear. There is a risk, though probably small, that a federal judge would
refuse to enforce such an agreement on the ground that it embodies a
doctrine Congress refused to enact when it adopted the Federal Rules of
Evidence. There also is a risk that a federal judge would view such a
contract as invading a judicial prerogative-restricting the judge's power
to make sure that all the evidence that will help the jury ascertain the
truth is accessible. Clearly there is a substantial risk that a judge will
refuse to honor such a contract if doing so would make it impossible to
determine whether a subsequent settlement agreement should be en-
forced. To write such an agreement that purported to go this far would
be unwise in most circumstances. Similarly, courts can be expected to




penetrate any such agreement when it is necessary to determine whether
the parties engaged in illegal conduct or set up a relationship that vio-
lated public policy.
3 9 6
Confidentiality contracts that threaten none of these more compel-
ling public policies, however, may be enforceable, at least in instances
when they are entered into by parties who are competent and represented
by counsel, and between whom there are not dangerous differences in
bargaining power. A California appellate court has upheld such a con-
tract as it applied to a voluntary mediation.
397
Lawyers looking for creative ways to use contracts to increase pro-
tection for the confidentiality of settlement communications might find
interesting a suggestion in United States v. Cook.398 In a footnote, a panel
of Fifth Circuit judges indicated that they would be receptive to an argu-
ment that a party who promised-as part of a settlement contract in one
case-not to use that settlement outside the action in which it was en-
tered, should be estopped from introducing evidence from the settlement
in a subsequent suit.39 9 Defendants in a criminal trial that the govern-
ment launched after it had settled an earlier civil matter with them ar-
gued that "the government was estopped from using the injunction
documents [a consent decree that resulted from a settlement agreement]
because of the specific prohibition they contained against their use for
any purpose other than 'the purpose of this action.' "400 Characterizing
this argument as "persuasive," the Cook court went on to opine that in
"simple equity, the government should not be allowed to induce or ob-
tain a defendant's consent to settlement under specific terms, and later
violate those terms." 4 1 This comment suggests that counsel should con-
sider adding clauses that explicitly limit the permissible uses of settle-
ment material to their settlement contracts or to agreements that fix the
rules for settlement negotiations.
The caveat that courts will not enforce such agreements if their pur-
pose or effect violates public policy is reflected in the opinion of the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal in Mary R. v. B. & R. Corp.402 In that case, the
396. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5039, at 207-08.
397. Simrin v. Simrin, 233 Cal. App. 2d 90, 95, 43 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1965). See gener-
ally Note, supra note 3, at 450-52 (focusing on the status of stipulations whose effect is to
exclude relevant evidence); 21 C. WRIGrr & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5039 (same); 22 C.
WRIGTrr & K. GRAHAM, supra note 14, § 5194 (same).




402. 149 Cal. App. 3d 308, 196 Cal. Rptr. 871 (1983).
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court refused to enforce a term of a settlement agreement that purported
to prohibit the plaintiff, the alleged victim of child molestation by a phy-
sician, from revealing information to regulatory authorities.4 3 While the
facts of that case were unusual, the principle that emerges from it could
apply in a wide range of more commonly occurring situations. In the
securities area, for example, courts might well refuse to honor a contract,
whether or not it led to a settlement agreement, in which the parties
agreed that neither would share with the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion or anyone else information about insider trading that it learned dur-
ing settlement discussions. Similarly, parties should not expect courts to
enforce agreements between competitors that purport to prohibit disclo-
sure or admission at trial of communications whose purpose or effect was
to promote anticompetitive activities, even if these communications oc-
curred during settlement negotiations.
Moreover, courts that follow precedents developed in cases dealing
with the enforceability of "stipulations" could find many different
grounds on which to relieve a party of an apparent contractual commit-
ment limiting the admissibility of communications made or acts commit-
ted during the course of settlement discussions. Courts may relieve a
party from a stipulation because it was procured by fraud, because it was
entered as a result of misrepresentation, mistake of fact, or excusable ne-
glect, or because there has been such a substantial change in circum-
stances that binding the party to the stipulation would be unfair. 40 4 The
significance of these grounds for relief from a stipulation lies in the fact
that they also are commonly presented bases for relief from a settlement
agreement. As explained earlier, rule 408 would not bar admission of
communications made during settlement negotiations if the purpose for
which they would be admitted is to prove that the settlement contract is
unenforceable because it was procured by fraud, or was entered as a re-
sult of misrepresentation, mistake of fact, or excusable neglect.40 5 Thus a
party might be able to use the same ground both to escape a contractual
commitment not to disclose communications made during negotiations
and to defeat the settlement agreement itself.
One additional warning is in order here. When the basis for subject
matter jurisdiction in federal court is diversity of citizenship, there is a
possibility that state law, rather than federal common law, will determine
whether or not a contract that enlarges the protections of rule 408-for
example, by making communications during negotiations inadmissible
403. Id. at 316, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
404. See People v. Trujillo, 67 Cal. App. 3d 547, 555, 136 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (1977).
405. See supra notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
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for any purpose-is enforceable. Professors Wright and Graham suggest
that courts deciding whether to enforce such contracts should consider
doctrines developed in the law of procedure and doctrines developed in
the substantive law of contract, arguing that procedural analysis should
be based on federal common law in diversity cases, but that the substan-
tive contract analysis should be based on the law of the relevant state.
40 6
In Blum v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 407 the Eleventh Circuit assumed,
without conducting a detailed analysis under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins4° 8 and its progeny, that in a diversity case the enforceability of
stipulations whose effect is to limit the admissibility of evidence is a ques-
tion to be resolved under state law.
Conclusion
Despite commonly made assumptions, and the apparent promise of
Federal Rule of Evidence 408, there are many circumstances in which
many courts would permit both the discovery and the admission at trial
of confidential settlement communications. Given the unpredictability of
judicial rulings in this area, and the unforeseeability of events that could
result in disclosure or admission at trial of settlement communications,
good lawyers have no choice but to proceed with caution in this area. If
confidentiality is their client's paramount concern, counsel should not
rely on the rules of evidence for protection and should consider taking
some of the extra precautions described in the latter sections of this
Article.
406. See 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM supra note 14, § 5339.
407. 709 F.2d 1463, 1465 (1lth Cir. 1983).
408. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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